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The chapters presented in this dissertation deal with two labor market
issues in the United States: (1) the impact of the cost of health insurance on
households’ choice of employment sector and (2) job attachment patterns of
men and women. Chapter 1 presents the motivation for the research. Chap-
ter 2 models the effect of employer-provided health insurance on households’
decision concerning whether to select into the wage-salary sector or the self-
employment sector. Chapter 3 provides an empirical test of this issue. Chapter
4 provides empirical support for a possible theory explaining why women might
exhibit stronger attachment to their job relative to men, early in their careers.
Chapter 5 presents the major conclusions of the dissertation and suggests di-





List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Health Insurance and Household Employment Sec-
tor Choices 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Single-person Labor Supply Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Married Households’ Labor Supply Problem . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1 Both Spouses in self-employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 Both Spouses in wage-salary sector . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.3 Married Households - One spouse in wage employment
and the other in self-employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Firm’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.1 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6 The Insurance Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
ix
Chapter 3. Spousal Health Insurance and Women’s Employ-
ment Sector Choices 44
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Theoretical Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.1 Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 The Self-Employment Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter 4. Job Attachment Patterns of Men and Women:
The Role of Promotion Expectations and Experi-
ence 76
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Data and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4.1 Basic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.2 Gender-Promotion Expectation Comparisons . . . . . . 89
4.4.3 Gender-Promotion Expectation-Experience Comparisons 91
4.4.4 Early Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4.5 Late Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4.6 Individuals in Both Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101





3.1 Percent Distribution of Wage-Salary and Self-Employed Women
Workers in Non-Agricultural Occupations, by Selected Charac-
teristics, 1984-85 and 1990-91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Percent Distribution of Self-Employed and Wage-Salary Mar-
ried Women Workers in Non-Agricultural Occupations, by Se-
lected Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices:
Partial Effects on Response Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Average After-Tax Price of Health Insurance . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial
Effects on Response Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial
Effects on Response Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7 Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial
Effects on Response Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.1 Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1979-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1996-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 Descriptive Statistics - Entire Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4 Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job, Double and Triple Difference . . . . . . . . 106
4.5 Triple Difference Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.6 Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job by Time Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.7 Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1979-1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8 Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1996-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.9 Triple Difference Marginal Effects
Individuals in Both Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
xi
List of Figures
2.1 Mass of married workers with husbands in wage-employment
and wives in self-employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 An Equilibrium Health Insurance Premium, with Adverse Se-
lection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Choice Problem of Type I and Type II Workers . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 Distribution of Weekly Hours: Married Women Covered/




In the United States, self-employment among the civilian non-agricultural
labor force declined from the 1920s to the mid-1970s. Thereafter, the trend
was reversed and the proportion of self-employed persons increased. By it-
self, this is a very interesting phenomenon since self-employment is gener-
ally associated with low levels of GDP per capita. As Blau (1987) observes,
“Even in most developing countries, where self-employment is typically a much
larger proportion of the labor force than in developed countries, the trend is
away from self-employment.” (p.446) From international comparisons of self-
employment, other important factors which are found to be highly correlated
with self-employment incidence are high marginal rates of taxation and restric-
tive labor legislation which raises the cost of layoffs to firms (OECD, 1992).
Neither of these phenomena is characteristic of the U.S. economy; marginal
rates of taxation are relatively low and have declined even further after 1986.
Moreover, the large shift from industrial employment to service sector employ-
ment since the late 1970s led to a decline of unionism, lowering the costs of
laying off workers to firms. In the light of these facts, the increasing trend of
self-employment in the U.S. invites further analysis.
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As the incidence of self-employment rose in the U.S., there was a con-
current trend of rising health care costs. The linkage between health care costs
and the labor market comes from a unique feature of the U.S. health care sys-
tem. In the U.S., employment-based health insurance is the dominant form of
financing health care; over two-thirds of non-elderly Americans receive health
insurance through employers, either their own or that of a family member.
This is due to the fact that the tax code in the U.S. subsidizes employer pay-
ments for health insurance, by excluding these payments from income for tax
purposes. If employees are paid in wages, they must pay taxes on those wages.
On the other hand, the employer-paid portion of the health insurance premium
is exempt from income tax. Moreover, since employee contributions for health
insurance are usually paid with after-tax dollars, economic theory predicts that
employers should finance insurance premium costs rather than shifting these
costs to employees, with a corresponding decrease in wages. Moreover, group
rates of insurance offered by employers are substantially below individually-
purchased insurance rates due to adverse selection in insurance markets. All
these factors make the after-tax price of employer-provided health insurance
substantially lower than the price of individually-purchased health insurance
(Gruber and Poterba, 1994). In the second and third chapters of my disserta-
tion, I study the impact of this ‘price wedge’ on households’ incentives to select
into wage-employment vis-a-vis self-employment. My objective is to explain
the observed trend in the incidence of self-employment.
This problem is interesting and important for the following reason: the
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U.S. labor market is considered to be a very flexible labor market, relative
to the labor markets of other industrialized countries, both in terms of the
availability of part-time jobs and access to flexible work schedules. However
employers rarely, if ever, provide health benefits to part-time workers. And as
stated above, the self-employed do not receive a tax benefit that is compara-
ble to the benefit extended to employment based health insurance.1 Thus, in
addition to the problem of adverse selection in insurance markets, the preva-
lence of the system of employer-provided health insurance in the U.S., together
with the tax advantages that go with it imposes a cost on individuals opting
for flexible work schedules, in the form of higher premia for health insurance.
Given the high and rising cost of health insurance, this price wedge is likely
to affect the assignment of workers across the two sectors.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, ‘Health Insurance and House-
hold Employment Sector Choices’, I address the following question: How does
employer-provided health insurance influence a household’s choice of employ-
ment sector - wage employment versus self-employment? I write down a sim-
ple model in which the choice of employment sector in determined jointly by
household members. In this model, the household takes the compensation
package offered by the wage-salary sector as given, and makes employment-
sector choices to maximize total household utility. I show that when there
is a price wedge for health insurance between the self-employment and wage-
1The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed
on their health insurance purchases. Despite this, the average after-tax price of health
insurance remains higher for the self-employed (Gruber and Poterba, 1994).
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employment sectors, labor supply to the self-employment sector is smaller and
to the wage-salary sector bigger, relative to the case where there is no price
wedge. Thus, the price wedge causes a distortion in the assignment of workers
between the two sectors. I also show that the extension of employer-provided
health benefits to dependents outside the firm through a family health plan
enables married couples to effectively eliminate the price wedge.
I extend this model to include the insurance-purchase decision for single
workers. In this model, in addition to choosing which sector to work in, workers
also decide whether to purchase health insurance or not. I use standard results
in the ‘adverse selection’ literature to illustrate how pooling the health risk
over the subset of workers who choose to buy insurance raises the insurance
premium, relative to the case where the risk-pooling is over all the workers in
the firm. Moreover, firms can economize on fixed costs by getting as many
workers as possible to participate in the group health insurance that they offer.
This result could explain why firms might prefer to include health benefits as
part of the compensation package to all workers, instead of making the choice
of health coverage optional.
In the third chapter of my dissertation ‘Spousal Health Insurance and
Women’s Employment Sector Choices’, I study whether the availability of
health coverage through the spouse’s health plan influences a married woman’s
decision to become self-employed. This chapter is motivated by two empirical
facts: (1) the increasing incidence of self-employment among women in the
United States since the mid-1970s - both in absolute and relative terms, and
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(2) the prevalence of married women in self-employment. The absolute increase
in the numbers of self-employed women is not surprising in itself. This could
be a consequence of their increasing labor force participation. And the large
shift from industrial employment to service sector employment during the
1980s dramatically expanded the opportunities for self-employment and could
explain the relative increase in self-employment rates. However, this was also
a period of rising real health care costs. Thus, although the self-employment
option was easily available for women looking for flexible work schedules, it
was a costly option to exercise for those who had to purchase their own health
insurance coverage, at rates that were invariably more expensive than group
insurance rates offered by firms. On the other hand, women who had health
coverage through a spouse’s health plan could focus on other job attributes
like flexibility and non-standard work schedules. This could account for the
prevalence of married women in self-employment.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced a tax subsidy for
the self-employed to purchase their own health insurance. I test whether
this ‘natural’ experiment induced more women without spousal health insur-
ance coverage to select into self-employment. My estimates suggest that the
availability of health coverage through the spouse had a positive and signif-
icant effect on women’s self-employment propensities before TRA86. More-
over, the difference-in-difference estimates indicate that the incidence of self-
employment among women who did not enjoy spousal health benefits went up
in the post-TRA86 period.
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In the fourth chapter of my dissertation ‘Job Attachment Patterns
of Men and Women: The Role of Promotion Expectations and Experience’
(joint with Richard Prisinzano), we study job turnover behavior by men and
women. Labor economists studying job turnover behavior in the 1960s and
1970s in the United States found that women exhibited substantially higher
job turnover rates compared to men. Researchers ascribed this behavior to the
long stretches of time that women spent out of the labor force. Subsequent
research has attributed the gender wage-gap to women’s lack of attachment to
the labor force. One theory that links gender differences in turnover behavior
to the gender wage gap suggests that since firms anticipate higher turnover
from women, they are not willing to invest as much in training and promoting
women as they are in men. Since firm-specific training tends to be highly cor-
related with promotions and career growth within the firm, promotion rates
for men tend to be much higher for men relative to women. These differences
in promotion rates translate into a gender wage gap.
Women’s labor force participation has increased dramatically over the
past few decades, prompting researchers to re-examine job turnover behavior
by men and women. There is evidence suggesting that more recent cohorts
of women have a higher propensity to stay on their jobs and are exhibiting a
strong attachment to the labor market.2 We would expect firms to treat these
women - the ‘stayers’ - no differently from men. However, women workers
are still a heterogenous group comprising both ‘stayers’ and ‘quitters,’ with
2See Prisinzano (2004), Light and Ureta(1992), and references therein.
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higher average turnover rates than men. If firms cannot distinguish between
the two types of women workers based on observable characteristics, statistical
discrimination would still result in lower promotion rates for women and a
persistence of the wage gap. If, on the other hand, the women who are strongly
committed to their careers could successfully signal their intentions to stay in
the labor force and separate themselves from the quitters, they could overcome
internal labor market discrimination.
We hypothesize that women who are concerned about their careers use
job attachment as a means to signal their attachment to the labor force. This
concern is likely to be highest for women in the early stages of their career.
We therefore expect women with little or no job market experience to have
lower job turnover rates compared to men of similar experience, all else equal.
Thus, during this period we expect women to exhibit less sensitivity to expec-
tations of promotion, relative to men. This rationale also suggests that once
women have gained adequate labor market experience and revealed themselves
as stayers, their job attachment patterns should respond more closely to their
expectations of promotions. Hence, we expect women with adequate job mar-
ket experience to reveal job attachment patterns similar to those of men.
We use a longitudinal dataset to test our predictions. Specifically, we
study how the expectation of promotion affects the decision to stay on a job
and whether this pattern varies by gender and by the amount of labor mar-
ket experience. The dataset also contains information on workers’ perceived
chances of promotion in their current job. We expect workers who are con-
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cerned about their careers to be sensitive to the potential for career growth
in their firms. We examine how turnover behavior responds to this subjective
likelihood of promotion and how this response differs by gender and experience
level. Our results suggest that individuals with low expectations of promotion
are less likely to stay on their jobs relative to those with high expectations of
promotion. We also find evidence that women are more likely than men to stay
on a job all else equal. Furthermore, women with low promotion expectations
are more likely than comparable men to stay on a job and this difference is
more pronounced early in careers. The fact that the difference diminishes with
experience supports our hypothesis.
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Chapter 2
Health Insurance and Household Employment
Sector Choices
2.1 Introduction
Employment-based health insurance continues to be the dominant form
of financing health care in the United States; over two-thirds of non-elderly
Americans receive health insurance through employers. Group rates of in-
surance (also known as community-rated premia) offered by employers are
substantially below individual rates (also known as risk-rated premia) due to
adverse selection in insurance markets. While some self-employed individuals
enjoy group insurance coverage, the majority of those with coverage purchase
insurance on their own account (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). These individu-
als therefore face a substantially higher premium for health insurance, relative
to salaried workers. With high and rapidly rising health care costs in the
U.S., this ‘price wedge’ is likely to create a distortion in labor market out-
comes, by affecting the assignment of workers across the wage-employment
and self-employment sectors. This is the issue that I address in this chapter.
A closely related line of research explores the linkage between married
women’s labor supply choices - both hours worked and choice of employment
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sector - and spousal health insurance. Married workers working in a firm
which provides health benefits can extend the coverage to their spouse and
other dependents outside the firm. This influences a household’s chosen bun-
dle of job attributes, offering married couples a greater latitude to substitute
health coverage for flexible hours, because of trading opportunities among
themselves (Lombard, 2001). A number of empirical papers have found sup-
port for this theory. Using cross-section data from the CPS, Buchmueller and
Valletta (1998) find a strong negative effect of health insurance coverage un-
der the husband’s health plan on wives’ work hours. Using the same data set,
Lombard (2001) finds that women’s likelihood of self-employment rises with
health coverage through the spouse. These papers treat the husband’s em-
ployment sector and compensation package as exogenous to the wife’s choice
of employment sector and hours worked.
In this chapter, I first write down a simple model in which the choice
of employment sector is determined jointly by household members. In this
model, everyone demands health insurance but the health insurance premium
differs between the two sectors. Households take the compensation package of-
fered by the wage-salary sector as given, and make employment-sector choices
to maximize total household utility. I address the following question: How
does employer-provided health insurance influence a household’s choice of em-
ployment sector - wage employment versus self-employment? I show that
when there is a price wedge for health insurance between the self-employment
and wage-employment sectors, labor supply to the self-employment sector is
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smaller, relative to the case where there is no price wedge. Thus, the price
wedge causes a distortion in the assignment of workers between the two sectors.
I also show that the extension of employer-provided health benefits to
dependents outside the firm through a family health plan enables married cou-
ples to effectively eliminate the price wedge. I extend this model to include
the insurance-purchase decision for single workers. In this model, in addition
to choosing which sector to work in, workers also decide whether to purchase
health insurance or not. I use standard results in the ‘adverse selection’ lit-
erature to illustrate how pooling the health risk over the subset of workers
who choose to buy insurance raises the insurance premium, relative to the
case where the risk-pooling is over all the workers in the firm. This result
could explain why firms might prefer to include health benefits as part of the
compensation package to all workers, instead of making the choice of health
coverage optional.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 describes the
environment in which workers and firms operate, section 3 looks at the sin-
gle workers’ labor supply problem while section 4 discusses the labor supply
problem of married households. I present the firms’ problem very briefly in
section 5 and discuss some comparative statics properties. In section 6, I intro-





The population in our economy consists of workers of unit mass, who
differ along two dimensions. Workers differ in their preference for flexibility,
indexed by θi which is uniformly distributed in the population along the unit
interval: θi ε (0, 1). A high realization of θ indicates a high preference for
flexibility. Flexibility can be defined along various dimensions; for our purpose,
we want to think of flexibility as the extent to which a worker has the freedom
in planning her work schedule over a specific time period.
The economy consists of two sectors of employment - the wage-salary
sector and the self-employment sector. In our model, the wage-salary sec-
tor consists of firms offering workers a compensation package in exchange for
their labor supply. The self-employment sector employs professionals like inde-
pendent owner-operators, proprietors and partners, and also includes workers
engaged in household production. For simplicity, we assume that a job in the
self-employment sector is associated with complete flexibility, while a job in
the wage-salary sector represents a completely inflexible job.
The compensation package in the wage-salary sector includes a private
health plan, which has two cost components - an average fixed cost component
Hws, associated with administrative expenses and overheads, and a variable
cost component h for every subscriber to the plan; h is small, relative to H.
The cost of the health plan for a single worker is (h + Hws). For a married
worker opting for a family health plan, the cost of the plan is (n · h + Hws),
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where n equals the number of subscribers to the plan. The cost of a health
plan for a self-employed single worker, on the other hand, is the sum of the
variable cost and the average fixed cost, Hse, (h + Hse) while the cost of a
family health plan for a married couple who are both in self-employment is
(n · h + Hse), with Hse > Hws. This is the trade-off facing individuals and
households making the choice of working in the wage-salary sector versus the
self-employment sector. The self-employment sector offers the benefit of full
flexibility but comes with the cost of higher premium on health insurance.
The wage-salary sector offers savings on health benefits as part of the worker’s
compensation package, but requires workers to give up flexibility in exchange.
We can interpret the term (Hse −Hws) as the premium wedge or price wedge
arising out of the different prices of health insurance facing the worker in the
self-employment and wage-employment sectors. 1
I assume that the worker’s preferences can be represented by a quasi-
linear utility function, given by U(C, I) = C + V (I), where C denotes con-
sumption and I denotes health insurance . u(.) is well-behaved and has the
usual properties: u1 > 0,u2 ≥ 0, u21 = 0 and u22 ≤ 0. I also assume that
incomes are sufficiently large so that we always have an interior solution. To
1The U.S. tax system favors employer-provided health insurance over individually-
purchased insurance in several respects. “Employer-provided insurance strictly dominates
insurance purchased on own account for both itemizing and nonitemizing taxpayers, due to
the higher loading factors on individual policies, the full deductibility of employer-provided
insurance expenditures relative to the partial deductibility of own insurance expenditures,
and the deductibility of employer-provided health insurance from the payroll tax as well as
the income tax.” (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). In this section, I ignore these details and
simply focus on the price difference arising out of differences in administrative costs between
employer-provided health insurance and individually purchased health insurance.
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focus on the impact of the price of health insurance on the choice of employ-
ment sector, I initially assume that everyone has the same valuation for health
insurance which I denote by γ; i.e., V (I) = γ. Thus, with this simple setup, I
focus on the choice that households face between working in the wage-salary
sector and the self-employment sector.
The economy consists of a fixed fraction δ of single workers and the
remaining fraction, (1− δ) of married workers.
2.2.2 Firms
I assume that firms operate in a competitive environment, both in input and
product markets. The firm takes the market wage ω, the labor supply functions
of the two worker types as well as the health insurance prices set by the
insurance companies, as given and chooses how much labor to demand, to
maximize profits.
2.3 Single-person Labor Supply Problem
If the worker works in the self-employment sector, her indirect utility
function is given by:
uses = θi + γ − h−Hse
where Hse À h.
This gives us an alternative interpretation for θ. We can think of θ
as reflecting a person’s ability to earn outside of the wage-salary sector; the
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higher the θ, the higher the worker’s earning potential outside the wage-salary
sector. However, I assume that θ does not affect a worker’s productivity in
the wage-salary sector.
If she works in the wage-salary sector, her utility function is given by:
uwss = ω + γ − h−Hws,
where ω is the money wage offered by the firm.
The decision rule facing the single worker is the following:
A single worker will work in the wage-salary sector iff the utility from doing
so exceeds the utility from being self-employed iff uwss ≥ uses
ω + γ − h−Hws ≥ θi + γ − h−Hse, which implies
θi ≤ ω + Hse −Hws
Lemma 1: The mass of single workers working in the wage-salary sector, µwss
and in self-employment, µses is
µwss = ω + H
se −Hws
µses = 1− [ω + Hse −Hws]




µwss = Pr(θi ≤ ω + Hse −Hws) = ω + Hse −Hws
µses = Pr(θi ≥ ω + Hse −Hws) = 1− [ω + Hse −Hws] ¤
If Hse−Hws is sizeable, such that ω + Hse−Hws ≥ 1, then all single workers
work in firms and µwss = 1. To focus on the more interesting case, I assume
that ω + Hse −Hws < 1 so that µwss < 1.
It is easy to observe that the price wedge for health insurance between the
wage-salary sector and the self-employment sector, Hse − Hws, affects the
assignment of workers between the two sectors. In the absence of the price
difference, the mass of workers in self-employment would be νses , where
2
νses = 1− ω > 1− [ω + Hse −Hws] = µses
The difference between νses and µ
se
s is exactly the price differential for health
insurance between the self-employment and wage-employment sectors.
Note that
(i) ∂µwss /∂ω = 1 > 0,
2The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed on
their health insurance purchases, effectively lowering the after-tax price of health insurance
for the self-employed. Velamuri(2003) tested whether this subsidy induced more women
without spousal health insurance coverage to select into self-employment. Her results suggest
that the incidence of self-employment among women who did not enjoy spousal health
benefits went up in the post-TRA86 period.
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(ii) ∂µwss /∂h = 0
(iii) ∂µwss /∂H
ws = −1 < 0
(iv) ∂µwss /∂H
se = 1 > 0.
2.4 Married Households’ Labor Supply Problem
I assume that a married worker knows not only his/her own θ but can ob-
serve the spouse’s θ as well. I also assume that the θs are independently and
identically distributed.
(θf , θm) ε (0, 1)
2
If both spouses work in the wage-salary sector, they each get the benefit
of health insurance through the family health plan provided by one of their
employers. If only one spouse works in the wage-salary sector, the other spouse
gets health insurance coverage through the employer-provided family health
plan of the former.
I assume a unitary model of the household such that the utility of the household
is simply the sum of the utilities of the two spouses. The indirect utility
functions of the households are specified below.
The indirect utility function of households with both spouses in self-employment:
use,sem = θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hse
The utility function for households with both spouses working in wage-salary
sector : uws,wsm = 2ω + 2γ − 2h−Hws
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The utility function for households with the husband working in wage-salary
sector and the wife in self-employment : uws,sem = ω + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hws
The utility function for households with the husband working in self-employment
sector and the wife in the wage-salary sector : use,wsm = ω +θm +2γ−2h−Hws
I now examine the decision rule facing married households.
2.4.1 Both Spouses in self-employment
Both spouses will be self-employed iff
use,sem ≥ uws,wsm ⇔ θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hse ≥ 2ω + 2γ − 2h−Hws (2.1)
use,sem ≥ uws,sem ⇔ θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hse ≥ ω + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hws (2.2)
use,sem ≥ use,wsm ⇔ θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−H ≥ ω + θm + 2γ − 2h−Hws (2.3)
From condition (1) we get
θm + θf ≥ 2ω + Hse −Hws
Conditions (2) and (3) yield
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θm ≥ ω + Hse −Hws
θf ≥ ω + Hse −Hws.
Lemma 2: The mass of workers in self-employment coming from households
in which both spouses are self-employed is µse,sem = [1− (ω + Hse −Hws]2
Proof: Let X1 = θm + θf
be a new random variable.3
Condition (1) now implies that X1 ≥ 2ω + Hse −Hws.
Adding conditions (2) and (3), we get
X1 ≥ 2ω + 2(Hse −Hws) > 2ω + Hse −Hws
Therefore, condition (1) does not bind and we have
µse,sem = Pr(θm ≥ ω + Hse −Hws) · Pr(θf ≥ ω + Hse −Hws) =
[1− (ω + Hse −Hws)]2 ¤
Once again, we observe that the price wedge for health insurance between
the wage-salary sector and the self-employment sector, Hse − Hws, affects
3The density of X1 is as follows:
a(x1) = x1, 0 < x1 < 1
= 2− x1, 1 < x1 < 2
= 0, otherwise
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the assignment of married workers between the two sectors. In the absence
of the price difference, the mass of workers in self-employment coming from
households with both spouses in self-employment would be νse,sem , where
νse,sem = [1− ω]2 > [1− (ω + Hse −Hws)]2 = µse,sem
From µse,sem , we have
(i) ∂µse,sem /∂ω = −2[1− (ω + Hse −Hws)] < 0,
(ii) ∂µse,sem /∂h = 0
(iii) ∂µse,sem /∂H
ws = 2[1− (ω + Hse −Hws)] > 0
(iv) ∂µse,sem /∂H
se = −2[1− (ω + Hse −Hws)] < 0.
2.4.2 Both Spouses in wage-salary sector
Both spouses will work in the wage-salary sector iff
uws,wsm ≥ uws,sem ⇔ 2ω + 2γ − 2h−Hws ≥ ω − 2h−Hws + θf + 2γ (2.4)
uws,wsm ≥ use,wsm ⇔ 2ω + 2γ − 2h−Hws ≥ ω − 2h−Hws + θm + 2γ (2.5)
uws,wsm ≥ use,sem ⇔ 2ω + 2γ − 2h−Hws ≥ θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hse (2.6)




and equation (6) implies that θm + θf ≤ 2ω + Hse −Hws.
Lemma 3: The mass of workers coming from two-earner households is µws,wsm =
ω2
Proof: Equation (6) can be restated as :
X1 ≤ 2ω + Hse −Hws
Re-writing the three conditions required for both spouses in a married house-
hold to work in the wage-salary sector, we have:
1. θf ≤ ω;
2. θm ≤ ω;
3. X1 ≤ 2ω + Hse −Hws.
From the first two conditions, we get θm + θf ≤ 2ω which implies X1 ≤ 2ω.
Note that 2ω < 2ω + Hse −Hws, since Hse −Hws > 0.
Therefore, the third condition does not bind and the above three conditions
imply that the mass of workers coming from two-earner households is simply
µws,wsm = Pr(θf ≤ ω) · Pr(θm ≤ ω) = ω2 ¤
µws,wsm is increasing in ω and is independent of all other parameters.
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2.4.3 Married Households - One spouse in wage employment and
the other in self-employment
A married worker in the wage-salary sector with the spouse in the self-
employment sector would have no incentive to choose a single coverage plan.
Opting for a family health plan would extend the health benefits to the spouse
and to other dependents, if any.
Households will have the husband in the wage employment and the wife in
self-employment iff
uws,sem ≥ uws,wsm ⇔ ω − 2h−Hws + θf + 2γ ≥ 2ω − 2h−Hws + 2γ (2.7)
uws,sem ≥ use,wsm ⇔ ω − 2h−Hws + θf + 2γ ≥ ω − 2h−Hws + θm + 2γ (2.8)
uws,sem ≥ use,sem ⇔ ω − 2h−Hws + θf + 2γ ≥ θm + θf + 2γ − 2h−Hse (2.9)
These conditions yield
1. θf ≥ ω;
2. θf ≥ θm;
3. θm ≤ ω + Hse −Hws
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Lemma 4: The mass of married, male workers in the wage-salary sector with
their wives in self-employment is µws,sem = (1−ω)(ω+Hse−Hws)−(1/2)(Hse−
Hws)2
Proof: This is clear from Figure 2.1. The area labelled A is the relevant mass.
∂µws,sem /∂ω = (1 − ω) − (ω + Hse − Hws), the sign of which depends on the
value of ω;
∂µws,sem /∂H
ws = −(1− ω) + Hse −Hws = −(1− (ω + Hse −Hws)) < 0
∂µws,sem /∂H
se = (1− ω)− (Hse −Hws) = (1− (ω + Hse −Hws)) > 0
The case of the wife in wage employment and the husband in self-employment




The ability of married couples to trade flexibility for health coverage among
themselves causes more workers with spousal health coverage to select into
self-employment. In the absence of the benefit of extending health coverage
purchased through the employer to dependents outside the firm, the utility
of a household with one spouse in wage-employment and the other in self-
employment would be:
vws,sem = θm + ω + 2γ − 2h−Hse −Hws
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Figure 2.1: Mass of married workers with husbands in
wage-employment
and wives in self-employment
 
 
The area of the region denoted by A = (1-w)(w+Hse- ws) – (1/2)( w+Hse-Hws-w)2 















and the mass of married workers,with one spouse in wage-employment and the
other is self-employment would be
νws,sem = (ω + H
se −Hws)(1− (ω + Hse −Hws)) <
(1− ω)(ω + Hse −Hws)− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2 = µws,sem .
Thus married households with one spouse in wage-employment and the other
in self-employment effectively eliminate the difference in premia between the
two sectors, because an employer-provided family health plan offers health
coverage to the other spouse and eliminates the need for the self-employed
spouse to purchase health insurance at a higher cost.
The total labor supply to the wage-salary sector in the economy is therefore
µws = δ · µwss + (1− δ)[µws,wsm + 2µws,sem ]
∂µws/∂ω = δ + (1 − δ)[2ω + 2 − 4ω − 2(Hse −Hws)] = δ + 2(1 − δ)[1 − ω −
(Hse −Hws)] > 0
∂µws/∂Hws = −δ + (1− δ)[−2(1− ω) + 2(Hse −Hws)] = −[δ + 2(1− δ)(1−
ω − (Hse −Hws)] < 0
∂µws/∂Hse = δH + (1− δ)[2(1− ω)− 2(Hse −Hws)] = δ + 2(1− δ)(1− (ω +
Hse −Hws)) > 0
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2.5 Firm’s Problem
I normalize the price of output to 1. Firms take the labor supply
functions of the two worker types as given, and maximizes profits by choosing
ω. I denote by Z, the vector of parameters for the problem: Z = {h,Hws, Hse}.
Max
∏
(ω; Z) = f(µ)− ωµ (2.10)
where I assume that f(.) is quasiconcave, differentiable and that the first-order
condition with respect to ω characterizes the firm’s labor demand as a function
of the parameters:
F ≡ f ′(.)− ω = 0
The aggregate demand for labor is simply the sum of the labor demand of all
the firms in the economy. Equating aggregate demand to the aggregate labor
supply gives us the equilibrium wage, ω∗.
2.5.1 Comparative Statics
The variable cost of health insurance h, has no effect on labor supply and
does not affect the equilibrium wage. Therefore, the only two parameters of
interest in this model are Hws and Hse. I look at the effect of changes in these
parameters on the equilibrium wage.
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Lemma 5: An increase in the average fixed cost of health insurance in the
wage-salary sector Hse lowers the equilibrium wage ω∗.
Proof: dω/dHse = −(∂F/∂Hse)/(∂F/∂ω), while
∂F/∂Hse = f ′′(.)∂µws/∂Hse < 0 and
∂F/∂ω = f ′′(.)∂µws/∂ω − 1 < 0
Therefore, the sign of dω/dHse = −(−)/(−) = (−) ¤
The intuition for this result is straightforward. An increase in Hse increases
the cost of being self-employed and causes the labor supply to the wage-salary
sector to increase. An increase in labor supply to the wage-salary sector, all
else equal, lowers the equilibrium wage.
Lemma 6: An increase in Hws, the average fixed cost of health insurance in
the wage-salary sector, increases the equilibrium wage ω∗.
Proof: dω/dHws = −(∂F/Hws)/(∂F/∂ω)
∂F/∂Hws = f ′′(.)∂µws/∂Hws > 0
Therefore, the sign of dω/dHws = −(+)/(−) = (+) ¤
An increase in Hws, all else equal, increases the cost of health insurance to
a worker in a firm and is likely to switch some workers into self-employment,
thus lowering labor supply to the wage sector. This decrease in labor supply,
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ceteris paribus, will cause the equilibrium wage to go up.
2.6 The Insurance Decision
So far, I have assumed that everyone has the same valuation for health insur-
ance and that everyone’s income is sufficient high for an interior solution to
exist. In reality, people have different valuations for health insurance and will
purchase health insurance only when this value exceeds the cost of purchasing
the insurance. In this section, I incorporate the insurance-purchase decision
into the above framework. I briefly discuss how this decision can lead to ‘ad-
verse selection’ when only a subset of workers chooses to purchase insurance,
causing health insurance premia to rise. Self-employed individuals acting on
their own behalf do not have the ability to pool their risk with anyone else and
consequently, face costly ‘risk-rated’ premia. This is one reason why health in-
surance premia between the two employment sectors diverge. Moreover, since
firms can lower the wages offered to workers in exchange for providing them
with health insurance, they also have an incentive of extending health coverage
to all their workers. This strategy has the effect of lowering the premium for
their workers and increases the firms’ ability to trade-off wages with health
benefits.
I restrict the analysis to single workers. In addition to differing in terms
of how much they value flexibility, workers also differ along another dimension
- in terms of how much they value health insurance. I assume that the value
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of health insurance is also uniformly distributed in the population according
to γ, along the unit interval: γi ε (0, 1). One way to interpret γ is to assume
that it reflects expected medical costs; the higher the expected medical costs,
the more the individual values health insurance. Therefore, γ reflects the risk
types of the population, ranging from the most healthy (γ close to 0) to the
least healthy (γ close to 1).
If the worker works in the self-employment sector, her indirect utility
is one of the following: (i)use,Inss , if she chooses to purchase health insurance
or (ii) use,¬Inss if she chooses to remain uninsured:
use,Insi = θi + γi − h−Hse, (with self-insurance)
use,¬Insi = θi, (without self-insurance)
If she works in the wage-salary sector, her utility is (i)uws,Inss , if she chooses to
purchase health insurance through the employer or (ii) uws,¬Inss if she chooses
to remain uninsured:
uws,Insi = ω + γi − h−Hws, (with insurance)
uws,¬Insi = ω, (without insurance)
Now, the decision rule facing the worker is the following:
Self-Employed Workers with no Health Insurance: A worker will choose
to be self-employed, without health insurance iff
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use,¬Insi ≥ use,Insi ,
use,¬Insi ≥ uws,Insi ,
use,¬Insi ≥ uws,¬Insi , which implies
γi ≤ h + Hse (2.11)
θi ≥ max(ω, ω + γi − h−Hws) (2.12)
Lemma 7: The mass of uninsured workers in self-employment is
ϕse,¬Ins = (1− ω)(h + Hse)− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2
Proof: From (11), Pr(γi ≤ h + Hse) = h + Hse
From (12), max(ω, ω + γi − h−Hws) = ω, if γi < h + Hws.
This happens with probability (h + Hws). In this case, condition (12) reduces
to
θi ≥ ω
With probability (1−(h+Hws)), max(ω, ω+γi−h−Hws) = ω+γi−h−Hws.
In this case, condition (12) becomes
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θi ≥ ω − h−Hws + γi
Note that when γi ≤ h+Hws, this implies that γi < h+Hse, since Hse > Hws.
In this case, condition (11) does not bind.
Therefore, the mass of uninsured workers in self-employment is given by
ϕse,noIns = (1− ω)(h + Hse)− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2 ¤
We have
(i) ϕse,noIns/∂ω = −(h + Hse) < 0,
(ii) ϕse,noIns/∂h = (1− ω) > 0
(iii) ϕse,noIns/∂Hse = (1− ω)− (Hse −Hws) = 1− (ω + Hse −Hws) > 0
(iv) ϕse,noIns/∂Hws = Hse −Hws > 0.
In the earlier model, where all workers had the same valuation for health in-
surance, the only effect of changing prices was to shift workers across sectors.
In the present model, changing prices can affect either the insurance decision,
or the employment-sector decision or both. For instance, in the above case,
a sizeable increase in ω can not only cause workers to switch from the self-
employment to the wage-employment sector, but for γi lying between Hws and
Hse, can also cause them to purchase health insurance through their employers.
Self-Employed Workers with Health Insurance: A worker will choose
to be self-employed, with health insurance iff
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use,Insi ≥ use,noInsi ,
use,Insi ≥ uws,Insi ,
use,Insi ≥ uws,noInsi ,
These conditions imply
γi ≥ h + Hse (2.13)
θi + γi − h−Hse ≥ max(ω, ω + γi − h−Hws) (2.14)
Lemma 8: The mass of workers in self-employment who purchase health
insurance is ϕse,Ins = [1− (h + Hse)][1− (ω + Hse −Hws)]
Proof: Condition (14) is true iff θi−ω + γi− (Hse−Hws) ≥ max(γi, h+Hws)
Note that since we have γi ≥ h+Hse from (13), we cannot have γi ≤ h+Hws.
Therefore, max(γi, h + H
ws) = γi
Condition (14) now reduces to
θi − ω + γi − (Hse −Hws) ≥ γi ⇔
θi ≥ ω + (Hse −Hws)
Thus, the mass of self-employed workers who choose to purchase health insur-
ance is
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ϕse,Ins = [1− (h + Hse)][1− (ω + Hse −Hws)] ¤
We have
(i) ϕse,Ins/∂ω = −[1− (h + Hse)] < 0,
(ii) ϕse,Ins/∂h = −[1− (ω + Hse −Hws)] < 0
(iii) ϕse,Ins/∂Hse = −[1− (h + Hse)]− [1− (w + Hse −Hws)] < 0
(iv) ϕse,Ins/∂Hws = [1− (h + Hse)] > 0.
Here an increase in ω, ceteris paribus, will switch more workers into wage-
employment, without changing the insurance decision. Changes in the prices
of health insurance have the expected effects.
Wage-Salary Workers with no Health Insurance: A worker will choose
to work in the wage-salary sector, and not purchase health insurance iff
uws,noInsi ≥ uws,Insi ,
uws,noInsi ≥ use,Insi ,
uws,noInsi ≥ use,noInsi ,
These condition imply the following:
γi ≤ h + Hws (2.15)
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ω ≥ max(θi, θi + γi − h−Hse) (2.16)
Lemma 9: The mass of workers in wage-employment who choose not to
purchase health insurance is ϕws,noIns = ω(h + Hws)
Proof: Since, from (15), we have γi ≤ h + Hws, we know that γi < h + Hse
This implies that max(θi, θi + γi − h−Hse) = θi
Therefore condition (16) reduces to
ω ≥ θi
We thus get the mass of workers in wage-employment who choose not to pur-
chase health insurance as
Pr(γi ≤ h + Hws).P r(θi ≤ ω) = ω(h + Hws) ¤
Note that
(i) ϕws,noIns/∂ω = (h + Hws) > 0,
(ii) ϕws,noIns/∂h = ω > 0
(iii) ϕws,noIns/∂Hse = 0
(iv) ϕws,noIns/∂Hws = ω > 0.
In this case again, a decrease in ω, all else equal, switches more workers into
self-employment, without affecting the insurance decision.
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Wage-Salary Workers with Health Insurance: A worker will choose to
work in the wage-salary sector, and purchase health insurance iff
uws,Insi ≥ uws,noInsi ,
uws,Insi ≥ use,Insi ,
uws,Insi ≥ use,noInsi ,
These conditions give us
γi ≥ h + Hws (2.17)
ω + γi − h−Hws ≥ max(θi, θi + γi − h−Hse) (2.18)
Lemma 10: The mass of workers in wage-employment who purchase health
insurance is ϕws,Ins = (ω + Hse −Hws)(1− (h + Hws))− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2
Proof: Condition (18) is equivalent to ω−θi+Hse−Hws+γi ≥ max(h+Hse, γi)
If max(h + Hse, γi) = h + H
se, condition (18) reduces to
θi ≤ ω + γi − h−Hws
If max(h + Hse, γi) = γi, condition (18) is ⇔
θi ≤ ω + Hse −Hws
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These conditions define the mass of workers in wage-employment who pur-
chase health insurance:
ϕws,Ins = (ω + Hse −Hws)(1− (h + Hws))− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2
Note that
(i) ϕws,Ins/∂ω = 1− h−Hws > 0,
(ii) ϕws,Ins/∂h = −(ω + Hse −Hws) < 0
(iii) ϕws,Ins/∂Hse = 1− h−Hse > 0
(iv) ϕws,Ins/∂Hws = −1− ω + h + Hws < 0.
A decrease in ω switches more workers into self-employment and all else equal,
reverses the insurance decision for those workers with γ lying between Hws and
Hse.
The total labor supply to the wage-salary sector in the economy is
ϕws = ϕws,noIns + ϕws,Ins =
ω(h + Hws) + (ω + Hse −Hws)(1− (h + Hws))− (1/2)(Hse −Hws)2
∂ϕws/∂ω = 1 > 0
ϕws/∂Hws = −1 + h + Hws < 0
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ϕws/∂Hse = 1− h−Hse > 0
The firm’s problem is the same as in section 2.5. Once again, the aggregate
demand for labor in the economy is the sum of demands of individual firms.
Equating the aggregate demand for labor to the aggregate supply ϕws gives us
the equilibrium wage ω∗. Again, we have the same comparative static proper-
ties. An increase in the premium for health insurance in the self-employment
sector, Hse lowers the equilibrium wage, ω∗ while an increase in Hws causes
ω∗ to increase.
2.6.1 Discussion
Presumably, workers who have low expected medical costs are healthy and do
not value health insurance at its cost. Workers choosing to purchase health
insurance, on the other hand, reveal themselves as the ‘risky’ pool of workers
with high expected medical costs. Thus, when purchase of health insurance is
optional, health insurance companies will increase the premium for those who
choose to purchase it. Intuitively, as the pool of insured workers gets larger,
the average expected medical cost is less likely to vary.
Assuming that risk types can be ordered, the premium for a pool of workers
including everyone from a risk type γj to the least healthy person can be
formulated as:
P(γj→1) = E(γ|γ ≥ γj)
The premium is therefore an increasing function of γj, or equivalently,
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a decreasing function of the mass of workers opting for health insurance.4
The expected value of medical costs to the insurance company depends on the
premium charged. As the premium increases, the healthier workers who do
not value health insurance too highly drop out of the insurance pool, and the
average medical costs of those who remain in the pool rises. The equilibrium
premium for health insurance is given by the following condition:
P ∗ = E(γ|γ ≥ P ∗)
Figure 2.2 graphs the values of E(γ|γ ≥ P ) as a function of the premium
P . The function gives the expected medical costs for workers who choose to be
insured by firms when the health insurance premium is P . It is an increasing
function of P . The equilibrium premium P ∗ is that level of P at which this
function crosses the 45-degree line, satisfying the equilibrium condition defined
above.5
Thus the health insurance premium is an increasing function of γj or
the expected medical costs. This tells us why firms might want to extend
insurance to all their workers, without making the choice of health coverage
optional; the bigger the mass of workers in the insurance pool, the lower the
4Since risk-rated insurance contacts charge a premium in proportion to the individual’s
expected medical costs during the life of the contract, premia in the individual market tend
to be very high. Estimates suggest that 10% of the population accounts for 70% of total
medical spending (Li, 2000).
5The existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed, and if an equilibrium does exist,
it need not be unique. There is a voluminous literature on this topic. For instance, see
Akerlof(1970).
38












E(γ /γ ≥ P) 
1 
39
premium charged by insurance companies. The lower the premium facing
workers in wage-employment, the wider is the potential price wedge for health
insurance between the two sectors. As the price wedge gets bigger, the labor
supply to the wage sector increases, causing the equilibrium wage to decrease
and increasing the profitability of firms. 6
When the option of not purchasing health insurance is taken away
from workers, for a given wage, those who have a high preference for flexibility
and low valuation of health insurance (the high-θ, low-γ workers) are likely
to select into self-employment. However, since θ does not affect a worker’s
productivity in the wage-salary sector, firms can still attract those workers
who have a low preference for flexibility and low valuation of health insurance
(the low-θ, low-γ types). These are the ‘healthy’ workers who will lower the
insurance premium and lower the firm’s average costs. The (low-θ, high-γ)
types have a strong incentive to select into wage-employment while the choice
of employment sector for the high-θ and high-γ type will be more senstive
to the wage, ω and the difference in health insurance premia between the
two sectors. These factors will impact how workers get sorted into the two
6The primary reason for the pre-dominance of employer-provided health insurance in
the U.S. is because it is subsidized through the tax code. If employees are paid in wages,
they must pay taxes on those wages. On the other hand, the employer-paid portion of the
health insurance premium is exempt from income tax. Moreover, employee contributions
for health insurance are usually paid with after-tax dollars. Thus economic theory predicts
that employers should provide and finance insurance premium costs rather than shifting
these costs to employees, with a corresponding decrease in wages (Gruber and McKnight,
2002). In this section, I focus on a different though related issue: given the primary reason
for providing health insurance to employees, why firms stand to benefit from having more
employees participate in the group health insurance provided by them.
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employment sectors in equilibrium.7
It is immediately apparent that the firms’ decision problem can get
very complex when θ is also an index of productivity in the wage sector and
additionally, θ is correlated with γ. Wages have to be very high to draw the
high-θ, low-γ workers into wage employment for two reasons: the reservation
wage for this type will be very high, and competition between firms to attract
this type of worker will bid wages up. If firms have differential costs to offering
health insurance to workers, then one can examine the equilibrium sorting of
different types of workers to different types of firms, and the size distribution
of firms. This is a topic for further research.
2.7 Conclusions
There is asymmetric information between individuals and health in-
surance companies over expected medical costs of those insured. This means
that individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based
sorting across plans. Firms have the ability to pool the health risk of all
their workers and obtain group insurance coverage for their workers. The
self-employed, purchasing insurance for themselves, do not enjoy this leverage.
7The preferential tax treatment for employer-sponsored health insurance (see footnote
above) suggests that firms should bear the entire premium cost for all their workers and
adjust wages accordingly. In reality, not all workers in a firm value health insurance at
its cost. Thus, one theory explaining why we see employee contributions to health premia
suggests that firms use employee contributions as a sorting device; by getting employees
to share in the costs of health insurance, firms provide health coverage to only those who
demand it and pass the savings back to employees in the form of higher wages (Gruber and
Washington, 2003).
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Thus, among the self-employed, the majority of those purchasing health cov-
erage pay substantially higher risk-rated insurance premia compared to group
insurance rates offered by firms. In this paper, I develop a simple model to
study the distortion arising out of this price difference, on workers’ choice
of employment sector. In this model, all workers purchase health insurance
but optimally choose whether to work in the wage-salary sector or to be self-
employed. I find that in the presence of a disparity in health insurance premia
between the two sectors, fewer workers select into the self-employment sector
relative to the case when there is no disparity. I also show that the extension
of employer-provided health benefits to dependents outside the firm through a
family health plan provided by the firm, enables married couples to effectively
eliminate this price wedge.
This model has some easily testable predictions. Changes in insurance
premia which narrow the gap between employment-based group insurance and
insurance purchased on own account will, ceteris paribus, switch more work-
ers into self-employment. Another implication of this model is that as the
premium gap between the two sectors widens, we should expect to see more
married individuals selecting into self-employment with the spouse working in
the wage-salary sector. This finding could explain the fact that self-employed
women in the U.S. are predominantly married women (Devine (1994a) and
Lombard (2001)). I test these predictions the following chapter.
I extend the above model to incorporate the insurance-purchase deci-
sion by workers. In this model, in addition to deciding which sector to work
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in, workers also make the discrete decision on whether to purchase health in-
surance. I use standard results from the adverse selection literature to discuss
the impact of these choices on the insurance premia in both sectors. A testable
prediction arising out of this model is that as the insurance premium rises, the
pool of uninsured workers in the population expands. This prediction finds
support in a number of papers. Gruber and Poterba (1994) showed that the
demand for insurance by the self-employed went up significantly following the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which introduced a subsidy for the self-employed on
their health insurance purchases, thus lowering their cost of insurance. Cut-
ler (2002) found that when employee costs for health insurance increased in
the United States during the 1990s, workers responded by declining to take
up insurance offered by their employers. His estimates suggest that increased
costs to employees can explain the entire decline in take-up rates in the 1990s.
These findings are highly relevant to the current debate on the state of the
health care system in the United States and the concern over the increasing
pool of uninsured individuals in the economy.
I also examine the effect of workers’ insurance-purchase decisions on
firms’ costs. I argue that firms can increase their profitability by leveraging
the premium wedge between the two sectors to lower wages. This gives us one
possible rationalization for why firms with large numbers of employees have
an incentive to extend health benefits to all their full-time employees as part




Spousal Health Insurance and Women’s
Employment Sector Choices
3.1 Introduction
The incidence of self-employment has increased in the US since the mid-
1970s, both among men and women. This phenomenon is well-documented by
Blau (1987), Devine (1994a, 1994b), Evans and Leighton (1989), Lombard
(2001) and many others. While there is some controversy over whether this
represents a sustained increase for men, there seems to be a consensus that
this does signify a long-term trend for women, with the self-employment rate
increasing both absolutely and relative to total female employment.1
The absolute increase in the numbers of self-employed women is not
surprising in itself. This could be a consequence of their increasing labor force
participation. The large shift from industrial employment to service sector
employment during the 1980s dramatically expanded the opportunities for self-
employment and could explain the relative increase in self-employment rates.
1Devine (1994a) found an increasing trend in male self-employment rates in the US
during 1975-1990 while Schuetze (2000) estimated a fall, between 1980 and 1994. Some of
this discrepancy may have to do with the data used by the two authors. Devine’s sample
included all civilians 16 years and older, while Schuetze’s sample was restricted to men in
the age group of 25-64. Both used data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
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However, this was also a period of rising real health care costs. To understand
how rapid this increase has been, it is estimated that between 1980 and 2001,
the total cost of employer-sponsored health insurance benefits has increased
four times faster than the cost of living (Employment Trends, 2003). Thus,
although the self-employment option was easily available for women looking
for flexible work schedules, it was a costly option to exercise for those who had
to purchase their own health insurance coverage, at rates that were invariably
more expensive than group insurance rates offered by firms. On the other
hand, women who had health coverage through a spouse’s health plan could
focus on other job attributes like flexibility and non-standard work schedules.
This could account for the prevalence of married women in self-employment.
A number of papers have found a linkage between married women’s la-
bor supply choices - both hours worked and choice of employment sector - and
spousal health insurance. Using cross-section data from the CPS, Buchmueller
and Valletta (1998) found a strong negative effect of health insurance cover-
age under the husband’s health plan, on wives’ work hours. Using the same
data set, Lombard(2001) found that women’s likelihood of self-employment
rises with health coverage through the spouse. From a household bargaining
perspective, this makes intuitive sense; the household takes the compensation
package offered by the wage-salary sector as given, and makes adjustments
in its labor supply choices to maximize total household utility . As Lombard
(2001) points out “Household membership influences the wife’s chosen bundle
of job attributes; for example, the wife may have greater latitude to substitute
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pay or health coverage for desired hours because of the trading opportunities
with her husband.” (p.215, fn 4)
Employer-provided health insurance in the U.S. is subsidized through
the tax code. If employees are paid in wages, they must pay taxes on those
wages. On the other hand, the employer-paid portion of the health insurance
premium is exempt from income tax. Moreover, since employee contributions
for health insurance are usually paid with after-tax dollars, economic theory
predicts that employers should finance insurance premium costs rather than
shifting these costs to employees, with a corresponding decrease in wages.
However, firms will be constrained in their ability to lower wages if workers
do not value health insurance at its cost (Cutler and Madrian, 1996). More-
over, group rates of insurance offered by employers are substantially below
individual self-insurance rates due to adverse selection in insurance markets,
and employer-provided insurance has a lower loading factor relative to indi-
vidual policies and is fully deductible while own insurance expenditures are
only partially deductible. Furthermore, employer-provided insurance is de-
ductible from the payroll tax as well as the income tax (Gruber and Poterba,
1994). These features of employer-provided insurance make the linkage be-
tween spousal health insurance and women’s employment choices interesting
and important for a number of reasons. If we think of the cost of health in-
surance as the price of selecting into the self-employment sector, then health
coverage through the spouse’s health insurance plan creates a price wedge be-
tween women who do and who do not enjoy this benefit. Given the high cost
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of health insurance, this price wedge is likely to create a distortion in labor
market outcomes, by either creating a mismatch between actual hours worked
and desired hours, or by affecting the assignment of women across sectors -
the self-employment sector and the wage-salary sector.
My focus in this paper is on the relationship between spousal health in-
surance and women’s choice of employment sector. The tax reform act of 1986
(TRA86) provides us with an opportunity to test this relationship. TRA86
introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to purchase their own health
insurance. This subsidy effectively lowered the after-tax price of health insur-
ance for the self-employed. I test whether this policy change induced more
women without health insurance coverage through their spouse to select into
self-employment. Gruber and Poterba (1994) tested the effect of TRA86 on
the (discrete) decision of the self-employed to purchase health insurance, and
found that it led to a significant increase in insurance demand among the self-
employed. In this paper, I focus my attention on another discrete decision
- the choice of employment sector - and study whether TRA86 affected the
assignment of women across sectors.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a theoretical
framework for studying the association between spousal health benefits and a
woman’s choice of work sector. Section 3 describes the data set used for the
analysis and presents some descriptive statistics. I discuss the empirical strat-
egy for testing my hypothesis in section 4 and present my results in section 5.




I want to describe the assignment of women workers with heterogeneous
tastes for flexibility across two sectors - the wage-salary sector and the self-
employment sector. The framework is essentially that of Rosen (1986). All
workers are assumed to be equally productive and to maximize utility defined
over two types of consumption goods:
u = u(C, φ)
where u is the utility index, C represents market consumption goods which
can be purchased with money and φ is the level of “flexibility” associated with
the job. Flexibility can be defined along many dimensions; for my purpose,
flexibility has to do the notion of the extent of freedom that a worker enjoys
in planning her work schedule over a specific time period. For simplicity, I
assume that a job in the self-employment sector is associated with a level of
φ = 0, which represents a completely flexible job. On the other hand, a job
in the wage-salary sector is associated with a level of φ = 1, representing a
completely inflexible job2. I assume that u(C, φ) is quasiconcave. Given C, I
suppose that u(C, 0) ≥ u(C, 1), i.e. all else equal, a flexible job is preferred to
an inflexible one.
2As in Rosen (1986), we can think of φ as a continuous variable such as the length of
time that a worker is required to be physically present on the job site, but make the actual
choices dicrete.
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I modify Rosen’s framework by imagining an economy that consists
of two types of workers - women who do not have health insurance coverage
through their spouse (denoted as type I workers), and women who do (denoted
as type II workers). The population of women workers is taken as fixed and
normalized to 1, with type I workers constituting a fraction µ1 of the female la-
bor force and type II workers constituting the remaining fraction µ2 = 1−µ1. I
indicate the market value of the health benefit accruing to the worker through
her husband’s health plan by H. I make the simplifying assumption that mar-
ried women take their spouse’s employment choice and compensation package
as given in making their own decisions. In this economy, everyone has health
insurance - through their employers if they work in the wage-salary sector,
through their spouse if they are type II workers and individually purchased if
they are type I workers.
To solve for the “shadow” price of the inflexible jobs in the wage-salary
sector for these two types of women workers, I denote by C0 the market con-
sumption on a φ = 0 job for a type I worker, and by C0H = C0 +H the market
consumption for a type II worker. By construction, C0H > C0. Given C0 and
C0H , I define C
∗ and C∗∗ as the consumption levels required to compensate
type I and type II workers respectively on the φ = 1 job over the φ = 0, with
C∗∗ ≥ C∗. We now have
u(C∗, 1) = u(C0, 0) and u(C∗∗, 1) = u(C0H , 0)
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Given that all workers value flexibility, it follows that C∗ ≥ C0 and C∗∗ ≥ C0H .
I define Z0 = C
∗ − C0 and Z0H = C∗∗ − C0H as the ”shadow” prices or the
willingness-to-pay for a φ = 1 job compared to a φ = 0 job.
The market is competitive but does not discriminate against either
type of worker. The self-employment sector offers a wage of w0 while the
paid employment sector offers w1. Workers take these numbers as given in
making their choices. The wage difference ∆w = w1 − w0 is defined as the
market compensating differential, or the implicit price for inflexibility. Figure
1 illustrates the choice problem facing type I and type II workers. Denoting the
market price of health insurance facing a worker by ph, the consumption and
flexibility levels of the two types of workers in the two sectors are as follows:
C0 = w0 − ph and φ = 0 for a type I worker in the self-employment
sector;
C0H = w0 and φ = 0 for a type II worker in the self-employment sector;
and
C1 = w1 and φ = 1 for both a type I and a type II worker in the paid
employment sector.
The vertical distance ab and cd measure Z0 and Z0H respectively. In effect,
type II workers have a higher reservation wage for the wage-salary sector be-
cause they enjoy health coverage through their spouse and do not have to pay
for it with their earnings. Therefore, the choice problem facing the two types
of workers can be described as follows:
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For a type I worker, choose the wage-salary sector if ∆w > Z0, and the self-
employment sector if ∆w < Z0. The worker is indifferent between the two if
∆w = Z0. Similarly, a type II worker would choose the wage-salary sector if
∆w > Z0H , the self-employment sector if ∆w < Z0H and would be indifferent
between the two if ∆w = Z0.
Given this choice rule, we can figure out the supply of workers to the
two sectors. If we assume that f(Z) is the density of type I workers’ preference
for flexibility in the population, g(Z) is the corresponding density for type
II workers in the population, with associated cumulative densities of F(Z)
and G(Z) respectively, then the proportion of workers working in the paid
employment sector is
NWS = µ1F (∆w) + µ2G(∆w)
The remaining fraction of workers, NSE work in the self-employment sector. If
∆w is sufficiently big, we would expect to see the wage-salary sector employing
a lot of both type I and type II workers. As drawn in the figure, for smaller
∆w, we would see more type I workers choosing the wage-salary sector and
more type II workers choosing the self-employment sector.
Labor demand is as in Rosen(1986). The market equilibrium achieves
a matching of workers with the least taste for inflexibility with jobs in the
self-employment sector and those with the least distaste for inflexibility with
jobs in the wage-salary sector.
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From Figure 1, we can predict how a change in ph affects the supply of
workers to the two sectors. A decrease in ph reduces the gap between C0 and
C0H and all else equal, switches more type I workers into the self-employment
sector. This is the empirical prediction I propose to test in section IV.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data, which is a nation-
ally representative survey of over 50,000 households. Every March, the survey
collects detailed information on personal and family characteristics of respon-
dents, labor force variables and health insurance status in the previous calendar
year. However in the March files before 1989, owner-operators of incorporated
businesses were coded as wage-salary workers. This is problematic for my anal-
ysis. Fortunately, the May CPS data files contain one question pertaining to
the current job of the respondent, where both the unincorporated and incorpo-
rated self-employed are separately classified. Thus for the 1984 and 1985 years,
I match the March and May CPS files and create a sample of women workers
for the pre-TRA86 period. This way, I get all the data on labor force and per-
sonal characteristics and health insurance status from the March files and a
correct identification of self-employed workers from the May files. However the
labor force information pertains to the main job during the week prior to the
survey while the health information refers to the longest job held the previous
year. While this is likely to cause a mismatch between job characteristics and
insurance status for a subset of our sample, a number of papers (Swartz (1986)
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and Shore-Sheppard (1996)) make a strong claim that March CPS respondents
interpret the health insurance questions as pertaining to their current job, and
answer accordingly. To the extent that this occurs, it not only mitigates the
problem but also suggests that using retrospective employment status and job
characteristics data is likely to cause similar problems. From 1989 on, the
March CPS files contain separate data on the incorporated self-employed. For
data after 1988, I therefore use the March files alone. Since the policy changes
introduced in the TRA86 went into effect in 1988, I combine data from the
March CPS files from 1990 and 1991 to construct a post-TRA86 sample of
women workers. To keep the data consistent across the two periods, I use the
labor force information pertaining to the week prior to the survey. My sample
consists of women aged 18 and above who are employed in non-agricultural
occupations. Individuals reporting themselves to be self-employed on their
main job during the week prior to the survey are classified as self-employed.
Table 1 gives the characteristics of self-employed and wage-salary women
workers over the period 1984-85 and 1990-91. On average self-employed women
tend to be older than their counterparts in wage-salary employment and this
difference has increased over time. The percentage differences among the var-
ious age groups indicate that it is the pre baby-boomer generations that had
a significant effect on this difference. The differences by marital status are
more dramatic. A significantly higher proportion of self-employed women are
married, constituting over 75% of all self-employed women in each of the two
time periods, despite an also significant decrease in this category across both
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groups. Another notable feature is the dramatic increase in the proportion
of single (never married) women in wage-salary employment compared to a
more modest increase among the self-employed. Over time, women entering
the labor force seem to be getting more education. The increases were highest
in the college education categories, especially among the self-employed. The
predominance of white women in employment and more so in self-employment,
has also been noted by other studies and is clearly reflected in Table 1.
On average, there is no significant difference between the two groups
of women in terms of the number of dependents living in the households. As
expected, the variance in hours worked per week is much higher for the self-
employed. They are much more likely to work part-time hours compared to
their counterparts in wage-salary employment, but are also more likely to work
over 55 hours. This U-shaped distribution suggests that the demand for non-
standard work schedules may play an important role in women’s employment-
sector choices. To understand how the choice of hours worked might be related
to the availability of spousal health insurance, we examine figure 3.2, which
shows the distribution of hours worked by married women who are covered,
and who are not covered by their husband’s employer-provided health insur-
ance policy. Women who are covered by their husbands’ policy are less likely
to work and if working, less likely to work full-time relative to women who are
not covered by their spouses’ health policy.
Table 2 presents some statistics on the sub-sample of married women.
A large fraction of self-employed women’s spouses are also self-employed, and
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this fraction is significantly higher than the corresponding fraction for wage
and salaried women in both time periods. A larger fraction of self-employed
women are covered by their spouse’s employer-provided health plan, relative to
married women in the wage-salary sector, but what is notable is the dramatic
decrease in this fraction among both groups in the post-TRA86 period3. This,
along with the fact that the presence of young children in the household does
not seem to affect the choice of employment sector, and that in the pre-TRA86
period a significant fraction of married women with spousal health coverage
selected into the wage-salary sector, suggests that the self-employment sector
attracts women who have an inherent preference for flexibility.
After studying these patterns, I look at factors which influence women
to select into the self-employment sector over the wage-salary sector.
3.4 The Self-Employment Choice
I specify a discrete choice model of self-employment choice for employed
women. I assume that a woman’s desired choice of employment sector E∗i is
conditioned by a vector of demographic characteristics Xi which includes her
marital status, family wealth Yi and the after-tax price of health insurance,
Pi.
3I consider only employer-provided spousal health coverage and ignore coverage through
other outside sources. This is because of changes in the CPS survey questions across years
which makes it difficult to determine whether the responses are consistent.
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E∗i = Xiβ + Yiγ + Piδ + εi (3.1)
In practice, what we observe is not E∗i but whether the woman is self-employed,
denoted by Ei = 1 if E
∗
i > 0, or in wage-salary employment denoted by
Ei = 0 if E
∗
i ≤ 0. The decision to be self-employed or to opt for wage-salary
employment has a random component εi. So the probability of observing a
woman in self-employment is given by
Pr(Ei = 1) = Pr(E
∗
i > 0) = Pr(εi > −Xiβ−Yiγ−Piδ) = 1−F (−Xiβ−Yiγ−Piδ)
(3.2)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function for the random variable
εi. I assume that F is the normal distribution and estimate the parameters of
(2) by fitting a probit model to the pooled data set, which includes observations
from before and after TRA86.
The hypothesis that I am testing in this paper is the following: since
TRA86 lowered the price of health insurance for the self-employed, this policy
change induced more single women and more married women without health
insurance coverage through their spouse’s insurance plan, to select into self-
employment, relative to married women who already enjoyed health insurance
coverage through their spouses. In order to identify the effect of the price of
health insurance on self-employment propensities, I use two sources of varia-
tion in my sample: (1) cross-sectional variation between women with health
56
insurance coverage through their spouses versus women without; and (2) time-
series variation, before versus after TRA86.
Each of these sources is likely to be correlated with other factors af-
fecting the incidence of self-employment. From the time-series variation alone,
it is difficult to disentangle other shifts that affect the attractiveness of the
self-employment sector vis-à-vis the wage-salary sector over this time period.
The cross-sectional variation may be driven by different attitudes towards risk
(Gruber and Poterba, 1994). By using both these degrees of variation how-
ever, I can eliminate spurious factors correlated with each degree of variation
individually and arrive at an estimate that denotes the effect of TRA86 on
the assignment of women across the two sectors of employment. This is the
difference-in-difference approach that I will use below.
The tax incentives for health insurance purchases by women who were
already covered through their spouse’s health plan did not change around
TRA86: “...TRA86 includes a provision disqualifying self-employed individ-
uals who are eligible for insurance coverage through a spouse from taking
advantage of the tax subsidy.” (Gruber and Poterba (1994), p. 723, fn 22).
Therefore, this group serves as a good ‘control’ group, and the difference-in-
difference estimate is given by the following equation:
∆2 = (SE1991a − SE1985a )− (SE1991b − SE1985b ) (3.3)
where SEt denotes the percentage self-employed at period t and the subscripts
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a and b refer to our comparison groups - either single and married women
respectively or women without and with spousal health coverage, respectively.
3.5 Estimates
Table 3 presents results from the probit equations such as those speci-
fied in equation (2). These estimates are based on the entire sample of single
as well as married women from the pooled sample4. Each specification controls
for a detailed set of individual characteristics. The estimates presented are the
partial effects on response probabilities. For indicator variables, this estimate
reflects the effect of a discrete change of the indicator variable from 0 to 1,
on the probability of becoming self-employed. For continuous variables, this
is the estimated change in probability of becoming self-employed, due to an
infinitesimal change in the corresponding variable.
I first test for patterns observed in Table 1. The results in the first
column are broadly consistent with that of other studies, and reflect the trends
seen in Table 1. The probability of being self-employed rises with age and
education. Self-employment rates are higher for married women relative to
single women, higher for white women relative to non-whites, higher for women
4I also tried to exploit the quasi-panel structure of the CPS. In the CPS sampling rotation,
households are interviewed for four consecutive months, and after a break of eight months,
are interviewed again for four consecutive months. Respondents can be linked across two
years because the second set of interviews take place in the same calendar months as the first
set of interviews (Welch, 1993). I matched individuals across the 1988 and 1989 surveys,
to get a sample of women from the year before TRA86 went into effect (1987) and the
consecutive year. However, since there was little change in characteristics of the individuals
across the two years, the results were not significant, and are not reported here.
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with children under 6 at home and residing in non-MSA areas. Women are
more likely to be self-employed in the post-TRA86 period relative to the pre-
TRA86 period5.
I next include family income from sources other than earnings as a
proxy for unearned income, to control for liquidity constraints that might
restrict women’s choice of employment sectors (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).
This variable is measured in 2001 dollars. The results, from column 2 of Table
3, reveal that its effect is positive and significant, suggesting that family wealth
is an important determinant of entrepreneurial choice. Since TRA86 affected
the price of health insurance for the self-employed through a tax subsidy, the
subsidy was more valuable at higher tax rates. Gruber and Poterba (1994)
calculated the average after-tax price of health insurance before and after the
policy change and their calculations are presented in Table 4.
I interact the family wealth variable with the indicator for the post-
TRA86 period to test for a differential effect of the tax subsidy by wealth
status. The results are presented in column 3 of Table 3. While the wealth
effect continues to be significant, the interaction term has no effect on the self-
employment propensity.6 One explanation for this result is that the constraint
5I have not included industry and occupation controls on the grounds that the industry
and occupation choices may be jointly determined with the self-employment choice.
6The TRA86 also lowered marginal tax rates significantly. Eissa (1995) showed that the
labor force participation of high-income married women increased as a result. One could
argue that it is this group that is responsible for the increased incidence of self-employment
after TRA86. However, from the results in column 3, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that after TRA86 wealthier women were as likely to be in self-employment as in wage-
employment. This suggests that increases in self-employment rates after the reform were
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of a higher cost of health insurance is not binding for the wealthy and therefore
TRA86 made essentially no difference to them. Gruber and Poterba (1994)
provide an alternative explanation. In their view, individuals are prone to
what they term ‘recognition effects’ as far as discrete decisions are concerned.
Here, this means that the magnitude of the tax subsidy is less important than
the introduction of the subsidy itself, which leads people to reevaluate their
options and make new choices - switching from not being insured to purchasing
health insurance, moving from the wage-salary sector to the self-employment
sector and so on.
Since the core of my analysis depends on whether or not a married
woman has health coverage through her spouse’s health plan, I matched the
husband-wife pairs in the data. All persons 15 years and older in the survey
who worked in the previous calendar year were asked if they participated in
group health insurance plans offered by their employers. If they answered
in the affirmative, they were asked whether their spouse was also covered
by the plan. I used the responses to these questions to ascertain whether
a married woman had health insurance coverage through her spouse. This
variable proxies for the price of health insurance; women who benefit from their
spouse’s health plan can be thought of as paying a smaller price for selecting
into self-employment, relative to women who do not enjoy this benefit.
I present the results on self-employment propensities controlling for
not driven by changes in the marginal tax rates alone.
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the presence of spousal health insurance coverage in column 1 of Table 5.
The health insurance variable has a positive and highly significant coefficient,
suggesting that health insurance coverage through the spouse significantly in-
fluences the probability of a woman becoming self-employed. Since we would
expect the value of an employer-provided family health plan to increase with
the number of children in the household (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1998), I
interact the health insurance dummy with the number of children under 18
in the family. The results are presented in column 2 of Table 5. While the
presence of children under 18 in the household has no influence by itself on the
self-employment decision, the positive and significant effect of the interaction
term does suggest that a family health insurance plan affects the propensity
towards self-employment, the more it is valued by the household.
In column 1 of table 6, I present probit estimates after adding controls
for husband’s employment sector. I excluded non-working husbands from the
sample on the grounds that they might be experiencing temporary, frictional
unemployment. I also excluded working husbands who did not report their
average weekly hours of work. These restrictions caused a significant drop
in the sample size. As seen in the descriptive statistics, the probability of
self-employment is significantly higher if the spouse is also self-employed. One
interpretation of this result is that it reflects positive assortative matching in
the marriage market (Becker, 1973). This explanation is also consistent with
the notion that selection into the self-employment sector reflects a preference
for flexibility, after controlling for the number of children in the household.
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In summary, these results indicate that health coverage through the
husband’s health plan, after controlling for the husband’s employment sector,
positively affects the wife’s selection into self-employment, a point made by
Lombard (2001). I also control for hours worked by the husband to test for
possible complementarities in the family’s time allocation choices. The results
are presented in column 2 of table 6. Again, after controlling for the husband’s
sector of employment and health insurance status, we find that women whose
husbands work over 55 hours a week on average, are more likely to be self-
employed.
The results from the probit estimates above suggest that a woman’s
propensity to be self-employed is significantly affected by the availability of
health insurance coverage through her spouse. This lends strong support to the
hypothesis that the externality caused by the extension of health coverage for
the wife through the husband’s private, employer-provided health plan creates
an important price wedge between married and single women. This price
effect in turn seems to affect the assignment of women across different sectors
of the economy. Single women who wish to be self-employed may be unable to
exercise their preference because the price of selecting into their desired sector
of employment may be too high. However, there may be several other reasons
why a single woman might not select into self-employment. By comparing
single women with similar characteristics before and after the tax reform, we
can control for these other factors influencing the decision to become self-
employed that may be correlated with being single. By comparing the change
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in incidence of self-employment between single women and married women, we
can control for other changes in the economy that may have affected the overall
incidence of self-employment, including TRA86. Under the assumption that
there were no exogenous shocks affecting only one of these groups, this gives
us a difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of TRA86 on the incidence
of self-employment.
To calculate the double-difference estimates described in the above sec-
tion, I run the following regression:
Ei = α + γ1single + γ2year + γ3(single.year) + γ4Xi + εi (3.4)
where Ei = 1 if the woman is self-employed and Ei = 0 otherwise, Xi is a
vector of controls, single is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the woman
is single and equals 0 if she’s married, year is another indicator variable which
equals 1 if the observation is from 1990-91 and equals 0 if its from 1984-85
and εi is a normally distributed error term. The interaction term describes
the differential effect of being single after TRA86. The coefficient γ3 measures
the double difference described at the end of section 4.
In order to estimate the double-difference, I collapsed the three mari-
tal status categories into two - (1) single (never married, widowed, divorced
and separated) and (2) married, and interacted this indicator variable with
the post-TRA86 variable. The results are presented in column (1) of Table 7.
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Although the effect of being single is still negative and dominates the interac-
tion term, the differential effect of being single in the post-TRA86 period is
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that single women in the
post-TRA86 period are more likely to take up self-employment, as our theory
predicts. To understand what is driving these results, I re-estimated this re-
gression using the original specification of marital categories. The results are
presented in column (2) of Table 7. Its clear from these results that TRA86
affected the self-employment propensities of the divorced/widowed/separated
women, and does not seem to have affected the employment sector choices of
the never married category of women, even after controlling for age7.
Even if we acknowledge the endogeneity of spousal health insurance,
single women serve as the “uncontaminated” sub-group of our treatment group
for TRA86 since they do not have access to spousal health insurance. More-
over, as mentioned already, in addition to introducing the tax subsidy for the
self-employed, TRA86 also significantly lowered marginal tax rates; it lowered
the top marginal tax rate by 44% but the decrease was less significant for those
in the lower end of the income distribution (Feldstein, 1986). Eissa (1995)
showed that the labor force participation of high-income married women in-
creased after TRA86, as a result of the decrease in the marginal tax rate. Since
married women are believed to be more responsive to a given change in the
tax rate compared to other demographic groups, the positive and significant
differential effect of single women in the post-reform period after controlling
7On average, women who have never been married are younger than married women.
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for any changes in labor supply of married women is a strong test of the ef-
fect of TRA86 on self-employment propensities. Besides, Gruber and Poterba
(1994) state in their paper that in 1988-89, less than one-half of self-employed
tax filers in most income classes claimed the tax subsidy (p.723, fn 23). This
suggests that the estimates presented here understate the effect of the tax
subsidy on self-employment rates.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, my focus of study has been the effect of the husband’s
employer-provided family health insurance on the wife’s propensity to select
into self-employment. A number of papers have found an association between
a married woman’s labor supply behavior and spousal health insurance. A
consistent finding in the literature on women’s self-employment in the US since
the mid-1970s is the predominance of married women in this sector. While
numerous papers have remarked on the relationship between spousal health
insurance and a married woman’s propensity to select into self-employment,
no clean test of this linkage was established.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides us with an opportunity to test
this linkage. The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to
purchase health insurance. At the same time, it disqualified self-employed indi-
viduals who were already enjoying health insurance benefits through a spouse
from taking advantage of the subsidy. Since the effect of the tax subsidy
was to lower the after-tax price of health insurance for those among the self-
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employed who were purchasing their own health insurance, I predict that this
subsidy increased the incidence of self-employment among single women. My
estimates suggest that health insurance coverage through the spouse biased a
married woman’s employment sector choice strongly towards self-employment
in the pre-TRA86 period. Moreover, the incidence of single women in self-
employment went up significantly in the post-TRA86 period, after control-
ling for the effect of health insurance coverage through the spouse. This
finding supports my hypothesis that the decrease in the price of health in-
surance through the tax subsidy induced more single women to select into
self-employment in the post-TRA86 period relative to married women.
In summary, my findings suggest that in the pre-TRA86 period, the
high cost of health insurance created a price wedge between women who en-
joyed health insurance coverage through their spouse’s health plan and those
who did not. Women who had a preference for working in the self-employment
sector and who enjoyed spousal health benefits were able to exercise their pref-
erence and select into self-employment. On the other hand, for women with
a preference for the self-employment sector but constrained to purchase their
own health insurance, it was too costly to opt for this sector. For these women,
the TRA86, by narrowing this price wedge, lowered the price of selecting into
their desired sector of employment.
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Table 3.1: Percent Distribution of Wage-Salary and Self-Employed Women
Workers in Non-Agricultural Occupations, by Selected Characteristics,
1984-85 and 1990-91
Wage Employment Self-Employment
1984-85 1990-91 1984-85 1990-91
52.67% 54.94% 4.30% 4.85%
Age
18-25 11.80 12.64 4.82 3.54
26-35 30.94 30.82 26.31 23.04
36-45 24.74 27.35 27.45 31.18
46-55 17.05 17.07 20.78 22.73
56-65 12.25 9.36 14.63 13.67
>65 3.23 2.76 6.01 5.83
Mean Age 40.26 39.35 43.70 44.37
Standard Deviation (12.87) (12.36) (12.92) (12.38)
Marital Status
Married 70.22 62.36 82.87 76.99
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 20.50 21.01 13.66 16.91
Never married 9.28 16.62 3.48 6.10
Dependents
Yes 21.08 20.63 20.14 20.20
Race
White 86.11 84.32 94.04 92.48
Black 11.19 12.58 2.90 3.72
Other 2.70 3.10 3.06 3.81
Education
< 1st Grade 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.02
Elementary 1-8 4.48 3.02 3.16 3.50
High School 1-4 53.83 47.75 51.03 45.63
Some College-Bachelor’s 36.16 42.05 40.01 42.39
Masters,Professional,Ph.D. etc. 5.46 6.97 5.65 8.46
Hours/Week Worked
1-20 13.76 10.84 29.29 22.81
21-35 21.28 17.21 18.17 17.94
36-55 62.36 54.79 42.15 36.57
>55 2.60 3.57 10.39 12.25
Mean Hours 35.62 36.78 34.06 36.35
Standard Deviation (11.42) (11.83) (18.55) (18.71)
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Table 3.2: Percent Distribution of Self-Employed and Wage-Salary Married
Women Workers in Non-Agricultural Occupations, by Selected
Characteristics
Wage Employment Self-Employment
1984-85 1990-91 1984-85 1990-91
52.67% 54.94% 4.30% 4.85%
Husband is Self-Employed
Yes 12.47 11.43 42.19 43.91
Covered by Spouse’s
Employer-Provided Health Plan
Yes 21.00 11.05 25.69 12.57
of which:
Employer Paid for
All/Part of plan 95.95 90.72 94.56 77.01
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Weekly Hours: Married Women Covered/












Table 3.3: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices:
Partial Effects on Response Probabilities
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0071*** 0.00711*** 0.00712***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age squared -0.00008*** -0.00008*** -0.00008***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Marital status (Base=Married) Separated/divorced/ -0.01061*** -0.01028*** -0.01029***
widowed (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Never married -0.01621*** -0.01603*** -0.01604***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Post-TRA86 0.00666*** 0.00664*** 0.00375***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Children age<6 0.0037*** 0.00375*** 0.00375***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Race (Base=White) Black -0.0273*** -0.02717*** -0.02717***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Other race -0.00439* -0.00431* -0.0043*
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Education (Base=No school) Primary school (1-8) 0.05286*** 0.05292*** 0.05292***
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258)
High school (1-4) 0.0576*** 0.05716*** 0.05717***
(0.0150) (0.015) (0.1499)
Upto 5 years of college .08778*** .08664*** 0.08665***
(0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0236)
> 5 years of college 0.14474*** 0.14208*** 0.14209***
(0.0430) (0.0426) (0426)
Non-MSA 0.00866*** 0.00874*** 0.00874***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Family income>50,000 0.01043*** 0.01439**
(2000 dollars) (0.0032) (0.0067)
Family income*Post-TRA86 -0.00403
(0.0054)
Number of observations 146,656 146,656 146,656
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors. All regressions include state controls.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 3.4: Average After-Tax Price of Health Insurance





High-income Self-Employed 1.455 1.307
(0.065) (0.041)
Low-income Self-Employed 1.389 1.355
(0.078) (0.068)
High-income Employed 0.900 0.902
(0.038) (0.029)
Low-income Employed 0.950 0.953
(0.046) (0.042)
Source: Gruber and Poterba (1994), Table I, p.709. The prices are calculated as the
ratio of the tax-adjusted price of health insurance to the cost of self-insurance for each
category.
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 3.5: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial




Age squared -0.00008*** -0.00007***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Marital status (Base=Married) Separated/divorced/ -0.00684*** -0.00731***
widowed (0.0013) (0.0013)






Race (Base=White) Black -0.02691*** -0.02677***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Other race -0.00387 -0.0038
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Education (Base=No school) Primary school (1-8) 0.05171*** 0.05137***
(0.0255) (0.0255)
High school (1-4) 0.05568*** 0.05545***
(0.0149) (0.0149)
Upto 5 years of college 0.08403*** 0.08347***
(0.0233) (0.0232)




Family income>50,000 0.01291*** 0.01277**
(2000 dollars) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Family income*Post-TRA86 -0.00297 -0.00256
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Covered by husband’s 0.00777*** 0.00565***
health plan=yes (0.0012) (0.0015)
Children age <18 -0.00039
(0.0006)
Children age <18*Family health 0.00222*
insurance plan (0.0009)
Number of observations 146,656 146,656
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors. All regressions include state controls.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 3.6: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial




Age squared -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Marital status (Base=Married) Separated/divorced/ 0.01307*** 0.0114**
widowed (0.0055) (0.0057)




Children age¡18 0.00219** 0.00218*
(0.001) (0.0011)
Children age ¡18*Family health -0.00121 -0.00045
insurance plan (0.0014) (0.0015)
Race (Base=White) Black -0.03142*** -0.03377***
(0.0026) (0.0029)
Other race -0.002 0.00133
(0.0044) (0.0047)
Education (Base=No school) Primary school (1-8) 0.04561* 0.06388*
(0.0334) (0.0442)
High school (1-4) 0.05568*** 0.06855***
(0.0216) (0.0266)
Upto 5 years of college 0.06913*** 0.08249***
(0.0278) (0.0335)




Family income>50,000 0.01175** 0.01705***
(2000 dollars) (0.0055) (0.0068)
Covered by husband’s 0.00753** 0.00821*
health plan=yes (0.0036) (0.0043)
Husband’s sector
(Base=Self-Employed) Husband in wage-salary sector -0.13096*** -0.12359***
(0.0035) (0.0037)
Husband’s hours worked






Number of observations 77,607 70,595
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors. All regressions include state controls.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 3.7: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices: Partial




Age squared -0.00007*** -0.00007***
(0.0000) (0.0000)














Children age<18 -0.00013 -0.00045
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Children age <18*Family health 0.00205** 0.0024***
insurance plan (0.0009) (0.0009)
Race (Base=White) Black -0.02693*** -0.02674***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Other race -0.00386 -0.00377
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Education (Base=No school)
Primary school (1-8) 0.05309*** 0.05154***
(0.0258) (0.0255)
High school (1-4) 0.05642*** 0.0554***
(0.015) (0.0149)
Upto 5 years of college 0.08467*** 0.0834***
(0.0234) (0.0232)




Family income>50,000 0.01011*** 0.0104***
(2000 dollars) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Covered by husband’s 0.00196 0.00585***
health plan=yes (0.0026) (0.0015)
Number of observations 146,656 146,656
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors. All regressions include state controls.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Chapter 4
Job Attachment Patterns of Men and Women:
The Role of Promotion Expectations and
Experience
4.1 Introduction
In documenting the pattern of lifetime jobs in the US using data from
the 1968-1978 period, Hall(1982) found that on average, women’s jobs were of
substantially shorter duration relative to men’s jobs. According to Hall, this
higher job turnover for women was a consequence of the long stretches of time
they spent out of the labor force. Researchers have studied the implications
of these gender differences in turnover behavior on various labor market out-
comes. Ureta (1995) examined the effect of non-employment spells on wage
growth, by studying the timing and frequency of non-work spells for a sample
of young, white workers drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys. Her
estimates suggest that 12% of the male-female wage gap can be explained by
women’s intermittent employment spells.
One channel through which gender differences in job turnover translate
into the gender wage gap is through differential rates of promotion for men
and women; some contend that women face a ‘glass ceiling’ that prevents their
upward mobility in internal labor markets (Gjerde, 2002). According to this
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theory, since training workers is a costly activity, firms are only willing to
invest in those workers from whom they expect to recoup the costs of training.
Given that the expected time horizon to recover these costs is shorter for
women, firms are unwilling to train their women workers. And since training
is invariably a prerequisite for promotion, promotion rates for women tend
to be smaller than those for men. These differences in promotion rates then
translate into a gender wage-gap.1
A significant increase in the labor force participation of women over
the past few decades has motivated researchers to re-examine job turnover
behavior by men and women. There is evidence suggesting that more recent
cohorts of women are as concerned about their careers as men, have a higher
propensity to stay on their jobs and are exhibiting a strong attachment to the
labor market.2 We would expect firms to treat these women - the ‘stayers’
- no differently from men. However, women workers are still a heterogenous
group comprising both ‘stayers’ and ‘quitters,’ with higher average turnover
rates than men. If firms cannot distinguish between the two types of women
workers based on observables, statistical discrimination would still result in
lower promotion rates for women and a persistence of the wage gap. If, on the
other hand, the stayers could successfully signal their intentions to stay in the
labor force and separate themselves from the quitters, they could overcome
internal labor market discrimination.
1Wages usually grow with promotions; McCue’s(1996) estimates suggest that between
9%-18% of wage growth is due to promotions.
2See Prisinzano (2004), Light and Ureta(1992), and references therein.
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Prisinzano (2004) estimated a bivariate probit model of job-stays and
promotions for men and women. His results indicate that the error terms be-
tween the job-stay equation and the promotions equations are correlated for
men, suggesting that the unobservables affecting the stay decision are corre-
lated with those affecting whether they receive a promotion or not. In contrast,
the hypothesis that the estimated correlation between the error terms in the
two equations for women is equal to zero cannot be rejected, implying that
whether women receive a promotion offer or not is uncorrelated with their
job-stay decisions. This seemingly strange result is the motivation for the cur-
rent paper. It is our view that women who are concerned about their careers
are using job attachment as a signal to indicate their attachment to the la-
bor force. We expect women with little or no job market experience to have
lower job turnover rates compared to men of similar experience, all else equal.
Therefore, during this period, we expect women to exhibit less sensitivity to
expectations of promotion, relative to men. This rationale also suggests that
once women have gained adequate labor market experience and revealed them-
selves as stayers, their job attachment patterns should respond more closely to
their expectations of promotions. Hence, we expect women with adequate job
market experience to reveal job attachment patterns similar to those of men.
Accordingly, we use a longitudinal dataset to study how the expectation
of promotion affects men’s and women’s decision to stay on a job and whether
this relative pattern varies with the amount of labor market experience. The
dataset also contains information on workers’ perceived chances of promotion
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in their current job. We expect workers who are concerned about their careers
to be sensitive to the potential for career growth in their firms. We examine
how turnover behavior responds to this subjective likelihood of promotion and
how this response differs by gender and experience level. Our results suggest
that individuals with low expectations of promotion are less likely to stay on
their jobs relative to those with high expectations of promotion. We also find
evidence that women are more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal.
Furthermore, women with low promotion expectations are more likely than
comparable men to stay on a job and this difference is more pronounced early
in careers. The fact that the difference diminishes with experience supports
our hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 gives a de-
scription of our data, the variables used in our analysis and some descriptives
for our sample. In section 4.4, we describe the empirical models we use in our
estimation, in section 4 we discuss the results and present our conclusions in
section 4.5.
4.2 Data and Descriptives
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for
the following survey years: 1979-83, 1996, 1998 and 2000.We restricted our
sample to those who exhibited a reasonable attachment to the labor market.
We eliminated respondents who worked for less than 15 weeks per year or less
than 20 hours per week in any year. We also eliminated respondents who were
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either self-employed, working in a farming occupation or industry, or in the
armed forces. This restriction removes those individuals that face considerably
different job and promotion structures than the typical worker.
The information on job changes and the subjective perception of pro-
motion possibilities on the current job are of particular interest for the present
study. Accordingly, we identify the respondent as a ‘job-stayer’ in a particular
year if he or she reported that the main job that year was also the main job in
the previous year. In the 1979 through 1982 surveys, the NLSY includes the
respondent’s assessment of whether the chances for promotion in the current
job are good. The responses are coded as: 1. Not true at all; 2. Not too true;
3. Somewhat true and 4. Very true. In the 1996 and 1998 surveys, a similar
question is asked as follows: “Do you believe it is possible for you to get a
promotion with this employer in the next two years?”, and the respondent
replied with a yes/no. One problem in comparing these questions is that in
the 1979-82 surveys, the question does not specify a time horizon while in the
1996 and 1998, the scope of the question is limited to two years. However, we
believe that the respondents interpreted the question as referring to a short
time horizon in the 1979-82 surveys, especially given that they were all be-
tween 15 and 25 years old. We therefore combine the first two categories in
the 1979-82 survey responses - Not true at all and Not too true - into one,
and label this as “Low chances of promotion”, and combine the other two
categories - Somewhat true and Very true - into the “High chances of promo-
tion category. In the 1996 and 1998 surveys, if the response to the promotion
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question was No, this was categorized as “Low chances of promotion” and if
it was Yes, it was categorized as “High chances of promotion.” This way, we
construct a comparable measure of subjective perception of promotion chances
on the current job.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the fraction of job-stayers and job-movers
among men and women for the two time periods, categorized by their self-
perceived chances of promotion. In the 1979-82 period, among workers who
feel they have little or no chance of promotion in their current job, a signifi-
cantly larger fraction of women workers stayed on their jobs. By contrast, a
much higher fraction of men stay on in jobs in which they think that the like-
lihood of promotion is very high, relative to women. Among the job-movers,
there’s no discernible pattern among women while a significant fraction among
men, nearly 60%, move jobs even when they think they have good chances of
promotion. We observe the same pattern in the 1996-1998 period.
The summary statistics for our sample are presented in table 4.3. Women
constituted less than half the sample, as did non-whites. Although we do not
see too many differences between men and women in terms of the marital sta-
tus variables, on average, women had more children. Women were also slightly
younger and had about an extra half-year of education. This translated into
a lower average level of potential experience for women. As expected, women
had lower mean wages, compared to men. However, a higher fraction of women
stayed on their jobs from one year to the next compared to men, despite a sub-
stantially higher fraction of women reported facing low chances of promotion
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in their current jobs.
4.3 Model Specification
In the present paper, we examine the likelihood of an individual re-
maining on a job. It is possible to estimate this decision using a simple probit
model of the following form:
yi = Xβ + εi (4.1)
where y = 1 if the individual stayed on the current job and y = 0 if she did
not stay on the job. X is a set of covariates, β is a vector of parameters to
be estimated, and ε is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. The
set of covariates includes characteristics pertaining to the individual and her
job. This model is appealing because it is easy to implement and interpret.
However, the model does not take advantage of the panel nature of the data.
We can incorporate the panel nature of the data into the probit model and
account for omitted variable bias by estimating a random-effects specification
of equation 4.1. The specification used in this paper follows the model proposed
by Guilkey and Murphy (1993).3 The model is as follows:
y∗it = Xitβ + µi + υit (4.2)
3Heckman and Willis (1976) and Chamberlain (1980) both present a similar model.
Hsiao (1986) gives a useful discussion of the literature. Butler and Moffitt (1982) describe
a procedure to calculate the likelihood function.
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where Xit is a set of covariates for individual i at time t and β are parameters
to be estimated. µi and υit are independent random variables with µi char-
acterizing individual i and following a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance σ2µ) while υit is a random disturbance distributed as N(0, σ
2
υ). Given
these conditions, we have the following:












Following from a simple probit, we observe the following:
yit = 1 if y
∗
it > 0 (4.5)
yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0.

































where Φ represents the standard normal distribution, N is the number of
individuals, and T is the number of observations for individual i. Xit is a set
of covariates for individual i at time t and β, µ, and ρ are parameters to be
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estimated.4
In order to capture the differential effects of gender, promotion expec-
tations, and experience on the probability of staying on a job, we adopt a
‘difference in difference in difference’ specification of Xit.
5 First, we examine
how the probability of staying on a job differs by promotion expectations.
Any difference in the probability is likely due to simple concerns regarding
the career path. That is, individuals may be less likely to remain on a job if
they do not expect to be promoted. Second, we examine how these concerns
differ by gender. It is possible that women and men differ in how promotion
expectations change their likelihood of staying on a job. The presumption is
that women may have different expectations about career length. We have
the following ‘difference-in-difference’ approach after combining the above two
analyses:
∆2 =(Pr(yit = 1)
L
F − Pr(yit = 1)HF ) (4.7)
−(Pr(yit = 1LM − Pr(yit = 1)HM)
where Pr(yit = 1) represents the probability of staying on a job, the super-
scripts L and H represent individuals who have either low or high expectations
of promotion, and the subscripts F and M represent females and males, respec-
tively. Equation 4.7 assumes that the difference in the probability of staying
4A pooled probit will provide consistent estimates of βσε with incorrect standard errors.
However, these estimates will equal the random effects estimates only if σ2µ = 0. If σ
2
µ 6= 0
then the preferred estimation method is the variance-components model of equation 4.6.
5The specification presented follows the example of Hamermesh and Trejo (2000).
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would be similar across promotion expectation if not for gender. The equation
is represented in the probit framework by:
Pr(yit = 1) =zitγ + δ1L + δ2F + δ3(L ∗ F ) + εit (4.8)
where zit is a set of covariates and γ is the corresponding set of parameters to be
estimated. L is a dummy variable for an individual who has low expectations
for promotion and F is a dummy variable for females. δ1 and δ2 are the
associated coefficients to be estimated. δ3 is the coefficient that identifies the
difference in difference expressed in equation 4.7. Lastly, we examine whether
differences in the probability of staying on a job given promotion expectations
and experience level differ by gender. Following the form above, we have:
∆3 =[(Pr(yit = 1)
L
F − Pr(yit = 1)HF )− (Pr(yit = 1LM)− Pr(yit = 1)HM)]I
(4.9)
−[(Pr(yit = 1)LF − Pr(yit = 1)HF )− (Pr(yit = 1LM)− Pr(yit = 1)HM)]E
where the subscripts I and E represent individuals who are inexperienced and
experienced and all other notation is defined as above. However, rather than
assign an indicator for ‘inexperience,’ we use a continuous measure of experi-
ence and its square. This difference is incorporated in the probit framework
as follows:
Pr(yit = 1) =zitγ + δ1L + δ2F + δ3(L ∗ F ) + δ4E + δ5E2+ (4.10)
δ6(L ∗ E) + δ7(L ∗ E2) + δ8(F ∗ E) + δ9(F ∗ E2)+
δ10(L ∗ F ∗ E) + δ11(L ∗ F ∗ E2) + εit
85
where E and E2 are potential experience and its square, respectively while δ4
and δ5 are the associated coefficients. δ6 and δ7, and δ8 and δ9 are the pairs of
coefficients that identify the difference-in-differences for low promotion expec-
tations and inexperience, and gender and inexperience, respectively. δ10 and
δ10 are the coefficients that identify the ‘difference-in-difference-in-difference’
expressed in equation 4.9. The remaining notation is as defined above.
The above specification allows for comparisons across different groups.
We are interested in the following differences. First, we are concerned with
the difference in the likelihood of staying across gender given low promotion
expectations and the same difference given high promotion expectations. The
former difference is represented by δ2 + δ3 + δ8 + δ9 + δ10 + δ11 while the
latter difference is represented by δ2 + δ8 + δ9. Second, we are interested in
the difference in the likelihood of staying across promotion expectation given
gender. For men, this difference is represented by δ1 + δ6 + δ7. The same
difference for women is represented by δ1 + δ6 + δ7 + δ8 + δ9 + δ10 + δ11. Lastly,
we are interested in how the difference in the likelihood of staying between low
and high promotion expectation men differs from the analogous difference for
women after controlling for experience level. This difference is represented by
δ10 + δ11.
4.4 Estimates
The results from the random-effects probit models are presented in table 4.4
. The estimate of the correlation between the decision to stay on a job in
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year t and the same decision in year t + 1, denoted by ρ, is positive and
significant. This result suggests that the random effects probit is the preferred
estimation.6 The implication of the positive sign on the correlation is that
individuals who stay on their job in year t are more likely to stay on their job
in year t + 1; in other words, certain individuals may be ‘stayers’ while others
are ‘non-stayers.’
4.4.1 Basic Results
An important determinant of staying on a job is changes in marital status. We
define changes in marital status for an individual as staying single from year t
to t + 1, remaining married from year t to t + 1, getting married between year t
and t + 1, or going from married to single between year t and t + 1. Individuals
who remain married or who get married are more likely to stay on a job than
individuals who are single, all else equal. The former group is 35% more likely
to remain on a job while the latter group is 23.5% more likely to remain on a
job.7 It is likely that this result reflects the notion that these two groups are
either more stable or desire more stability than single individuals. The stability
is likely due to the fact that individuals who are married have a dependent and
any decision is a ‘joint’ decision. The coefficient on becoming single between
two time periods is positive and significant. However, the marginal effect is
6In general, there is little difference between the pooled estimates and the random effects
estimates. However, the estimate of ρ is significantly different from zero in each model
estimated. Given this fact, we report only the results of the random effects probits.
7The predicted probability of remaining on a job at the mean levels of all continuous
variables and each dummy variable set to 0 is .5118.
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considerably smaller than the effects associated with marriage (14%). It is not
surprising that there is a small difference in the likelihood of staying on a job
for individuals who become single and those who remain single. This difference
may reflect the fact that ‘newly’ single individuals are not that removed from
marriage and have not fully realized their single status.
Presumably, two important considerations that affect job turnover are
the wage and the potential for promotion within the firm. The former reflects
the cost to the individual of leaving the job. The coefficient on the log of the
hourly wage is positive and significant. The marginal effect associated with
the coefficient is sizable at 28.76%. This result coincides with the expectation
that the higher the wage, the higher the cost to the individual of leaving the
job. The latter is likely important to those individuals who are concerned
with a career and the associated benefits. As such, we expect individuals with
low promotion expectations to be less likely to stay on the job. Our estimate
accords with this notion; individuals who have low expectations of promotion
on their jobs are less likely to stay on their jobs.
The effect of potential experience on job turnover seems counter-intuitive;
search theory predicts that job turnover will be high at low levels of experi-
ence as workers search for a good ‘match.’ Once good job matches are made,
turnover is expected to decline. Thus, we would expect the coefficient on the
linear experience term to be positive and the one on the quadratic term to be
negative. Our results suggest the opposite pattern. A possible explanation for
this pattern is that there are differential effects of experience by gender and
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by promotion expectation. We explore this hypothesis in subsequent specifi-
cations. However, it is important to note that the marginal effect associated
with potential experience is negligible.8
The coefficient on the gender variable is of particular interest to the
present study. Recent studies have found that women are more likely than
men to stay at jobs.9 Our result is consistent with this finding. The coefficient
on the female dummy variable is significant and positive. It suggests that
women are 12% more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal.
4.4.2 Gender-Promotion Expectation Comparisons
Column 3 of table 4.4 presents the results of the double-difference estimation.
The coefficients of particular interest are those associated with the variables
that are used in the ‘double-difference’ presented in equation 4.7. These vari-
ables are dummy variables for female and having low expectations of promo-
tion. The results from the basic specification presented in column 2 of table
4.4 suggest that women are 12% more likely to remain on a job than men all
else equal. It is not obvious why women are more likely to stay on jobs than
men. The unconditional probabilities of staying on a job are very close. In
our sample, 55.5% of men stayed on jobs while 56.9% of women stay on jobs.
This difference represents only a 2.5% increase. A reasonable explanation for
the estimated difference is that women may face a form of discrimination in
8The marginal effect of potential experience is calculated as the mean of effects in the
sample.
9For example, Prisinzano (2004).
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hiring practices. Under this condition, women may be less likely to receive
a new job offer. As such, women may hold onto jobs longer because the job
search costs they face are higher than job search costs faced by men.
If individuals are concerned with career ‘growth’, promotion expecta-
tions are likely an important consideration in the stay decision. The basic
specification supports this notion. That is, individuals with low promotion
expectations are less likely to stay on a job. The presumption is that they
will incur the costs of leaving a job in order to move to a job with more pro-
motion potential. It is also possible that individuals who have low promotion
expectations recognize they are not productive at the job. In this case, indi-
viduals may leave in order to find a job at which they are productive. The
estimation presented here does not distinguish between these possibilities but
as presented in the previous section, individuals with low promotion expec-
tations are 15% less likely to stay on a job all else equal. Considering the
magnitude of the marginal effect, it appears that promotion expectations are
an important determinant of staying on a job.
The coefficient on the interaction between female and low promotion
expectations identifies the double difference. It captures any difference in
the probability of staying on a job across promotion expectation that is due
to gender. The coefficient on the interaction is insignificant at conventional
levels. As such, it appears that women are more likely to stay on jobs than
men regardless of the promotion expectations. However, if women do need
to signal attachment to the labor market, it is likely that women with low
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levels of experience will differ from men with low levels of experience but
women with high levels of experience will not differ from men with high levels
of experience. In order to capture this effect, we estimated the specification
presented in equation 4.10.
4.4.3 Gender-Promotion Expectation-Experience Comparisons
The results of the triple difference estimation are presented in column 6 of table
4.4 and the marginal effects of interest are in table 4.5. In the case of the control
variables, the results of the triple difference are similar to the results of the
previous specifications. In the previous estimation, we found little evidence of
‘job-shopping.’ We found that the net effect of potential experience decreased
the likelihood of staying on a job. In the current specification, we also find
this result but the inclusion of the set of interactions that identify the triple
difference changes the interpretation.10 The net effect of potential experience
differs by gender, promotion expectation, and gender-promotion expectation
group. In the case of men with high promotion expectations, the effect is
simply the net of the coefficients on the potential experience variables. The
result suggests that as potential experience increases the likelihood of staying
on a job for men with high promotion expectations decreases.11 This result
10The set of coefficients is Female, Low, Low*Female, Potential Experience, the square of
Potential Experience, Potential Experience*Low, (Potential Experience)2*Low, Potential
Experience*Female, (Potential Experience)2*Female, Potential Experience*Low*Female,
and (Potential Experience)2*Low*Female. The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the full
set is 192.71 and its associated p-value is .0000.
11The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on the potential experience
variables is 21.99 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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is mild evidence of negative selection for men. In the previous specifications,
we also found that individuals with low promotion expectations are less likely
to stay on a job. In the current specification, we see a different result for
men. The marginal effect associated with the coefficient on low promotion
expectations also accounts for the interaction between this variable and the
potential experience variables. The net marginal effect is .0004. This result
suggests that men with low promotion expectations are .03% more likely to
stay on a job than men with high promotion expectations.12 Even though this
result is negligible, it also reflects a negative selection of men into long tenure.
That is, men who have low promotion expectations are also less likely to find
comparable jobs in the labor market and therefore, stay on the current job.
In the double-difference specification, we found that women were 12%
more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal. In the current specification,
we also find that women are more likely to stay on a job than men. The
marginal effect associated with women also takes into account the interaction
of the potential experience variables and the female dummy variable. This
effect suggests that women who have high promotion expectations are 16.5%
more likely than men with high promotion expectations to stay on a job.13 A
possible explanation for this result is that since women are less likely to receive
a promotion, when they are likely to receive a promotion they remain on the
12The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficient on low promotion expectations
and the interactions with the potential experience variables is 87.29 and its associated p-
value is .0000.
13The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with the potential experience variables is 22.61 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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job. The presumption is that men who have high promotion expectations
may be able to find a comparable job whereas women are not able to find a
comparable job. A possible explanation for why they are not able to find a
comparable job is our signalling story. Women must signal attachment to the
labor market in order to receive promotions (and the likely wage increases).
If attachment to the labor market is observed noisily from outside a firm,
women will stay on current jobs longer than men all else equal. The difference
is highlighted when we control for promotion expectations in the estimation.
We also find that women with low promotion expectations are less likely to
stay on a job than women with high promotion expectations. The marginal
effect associated with being a women with low promotion expectations takes
into account the coefficients on the female and low promotion expectations
variables as well as each of the included interactions. The results suggest that
women with low promotion expectations are 13.8% less likely to stay on a job
than women with high promotion expectations.14 Contrary to the result for
men, it appears that there is positive selection of women into long tenure.
Given the present specification, it is possible to compare across gender
and promotion expectations. A useful comparison is women to men given low
promotion expectations. This difference in the likelihood staying on a job is
due to the turning on of the female indicator as well as the female-potential ex-
perience and female-low interactions. The marginal effect is .0122 at the mean
14The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on low and the interactions with
female and potential experience variables is 131.82 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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of experience and suggests that women with low promotion expectations are
2.5% more likely to stay on job than their male counterparts.15 This differ-
ence in the likelihood of staying across gender increases if we consider men
and women with a potential experience level that is one standard deviation
below the mean. Women with low promotion expectations and ‘low’ potential
experience are 16.6% more likely than comparable men to stay on a job. This
result is of particular interest in our study. Our hypothesis is that early in
their careers women are likely to respond to promotion expectations differently
than men. Specifically, we expect women who are early in their careers to stay
on jobs for which they have low promotion expectations more often than men.
The reason for this difference is that women early in their careers must signal
an attachment to the labor market that men do not have to signal. As such,
‘job-shopping’ by women is a negative signal regarding labor force attachment.
It suggests that women who have low promotion expectations and are inexpe-
rienced are more likely to stay on a job than their male counterparts. Later
in the career, the difference in the likelihood of staying on a job between men
and women with low promotion expectations diminishes. For individuals with
a potential experience level that is one standard deviation above the mean,
women with low promotion expectations are only 12.8% more likely to remain
on a job than comparable men. Our hypothesis is that men and women’s
behavior in response to promotion expectations should be indistinguishable at
15The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the female-
potential experience and female-low interactions is 43.15 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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high levels of experience. Even though there is still a difference, this result
supports this notion.
4.4.4 Early Sample
As noted in section 4.2, the promotion expectations question in the
1979-82 surveys had four possible responses while the corresponding question
in the 1996-98 surveys had only two possible responses. In pooling the data, it
was necessary to collapse the four response categories from the earlier period
into two categories. To ensure that this restriction is not affecting our results,
we estimated the triple-difference specifications for the 1979-82 and the 1996-
1998 periods separately. In estimating the specifications for the earlier period,
we combined the two responses ‘Not true at all’ and ‘Not too true’ into one
category, ‘Low promotion expectations’ but kept the other two responses -
‘Somewhat true’ and ‘Very true’ - separate. The results are presented in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.6 and the marginal effects for the variables of
interest are in Table 4.7.
The results for the education, wages, children, living in MSA, race and
marital variables are all qualitatively similar to those of the pooled sample.
The coefficients on the detailed promotion expectation categories have the
expected signs; individuals who perceive their chances of promotion to be
small or moderately good are less likely to stay on the job relative to those
who believe that they have very good chances of getting promoted. Unlike in
the pooled sample, the net effect of potential experience is positive. However
95
the marginal effect still remains small and furthermore, the coefficients on the
linear and quadratic terms are not jointly significant.16
Similar to the findings in the pooled sample, we find that women are
more likely to stay on their job relative to men, regardless of promotion expec-
tations. Specifically, we find that women are 29.5%, 18.3% and 21.3% more
likely to stay on the job than their male counterparts for all low, moderate
and high promotion expectation categories, respectively. 17 Given that most of
the individuals in this sub-sample have low levels of potential experience, this
results supports our hypothesis that women stay on jobs to signal attachment
to the labor force. When we consider these marginal effects at one standard
deviation above and below the mean level of potential experience, the results
also support our hypothesis. However, we find that as potential experience
increases, the gender differences in the relative probabilities of staying on the
job also increase. This results is contrary to our expectation that as women
gain experience, their response to promotion expectations should be similar
to that of men. However, it is possible that signalling takes longer than 3.89
years.18
16The χ2 statistic for joint significance is 1.64 with a p-value of .4407.
17The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the respective coefficients are 28.19, 22.02 and
11.50 with associated p-values of .0001, .0012 and .0093 respectively.
18This value is the level of potential experience at one standard deviation above the mean.
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4.4.5 Late Sample
The results of the triple difference estimation for the 1996-1998 period
are presented in column 4 and 5 of table 4.6. The marginal effects for the
variables of interest are in Table 4.8. In the case of the control variables,
these results are very similar to the results of the full sample specification.
One notable change is the coefficient on the number of children. In the full
sample estimation, the coefficient is significant and suggests that increasing
the number of children decreases the likelihood of staying on a job by 3.2%.
In the current specification, the coefficient on this variable is negative but
is insignificant and carries a considerably smaller marginal effect (-1.3%). A
possible explanation for this difference is the fact that the children in the
household are more likely to be of school age and therefore, individuals do not
have to take care of the children. One other change is the effect of experience on
the likelihood of staying on a job. In the full sample estimation, we found that
experience had a negative effect on the likelihood of staying on a job, albeit
a very small one. In this estimation, we find that experience has a positive
net effect on the likelihood of staying on a job. The effect is also considerably
larger in magnitude than the effect we found in the full sample estimation
(2.5% vs. -.6%). This result aligns with the expectation that individuals are
more likely to ‘job shop’ at low levels of experience and are more stable as
they gain experience. Similar to the result from the full sample estimation, we
find that men with low promotion expectations are 3.5% more likely to stay
on a job than men with high promotion expectations all else equal. This result
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supports the notion that for men, there is negative selection into long tenure.
We find that women with low promotion expectations are 6.8% less
likely than women with high promotion expectations to stay on a job. In
each of the previous estimations, we found that women are more likely to stay
on jobs all else equal. This estimation yields a slightly different result. At
the mean level of potential experience (17 years), women with high promo-
tion expectations are almost 10% more likely than men with high promotion
expectations to stay on a job all else equal.19 However, women with low pro-
motion expectations are 1% less likely than their male counterparts to stay
on a job all else equal.20 This result supports our hypothesis that as women
gain experience in the labor market (and successfully signal attachment) they
will behave no differently than men. The fact that women with low promotion
expectations are less likely than their male counterparts to stay on their job
may reflect the fact that women’s careers are delayed by the need to signal
attachment to the labor force.
We find that women with low promotion expectations and potential
experience that is one standard deviation below the mean level (13.93 years)
are 2.6% more likely to stay on jobs than their male counterparts all else equal.
We also find that women with a potential experience level that is one standard
deviation above the mean level (20.7 years) and low promotion expectations
19The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficient on the female indicator variable
and the interactions with the potential experience variables is 9.48 with a p-value of .0235.
20The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with low and potential experience variables is 29.97 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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are 13% more likely to remain on a job than their male counterparts. It
appears that the gender difference in the likelihood of staying on a job given
low promotion expectations first decreases and then increases. We expect the
difference to tend toward zero and perhaps change direction as women ‘catch
up’ with men. It is possible that the result we find is due to the fact that women
may enter the labor force later than men. These women will have high levels
of potential experience but still be early in their careers. In an effort to explore
this result, we estimate the triple difference using the sample of individuals that
appear in both time periods in the following section. This sample comprises
individuals who are serious about their careers and therefore, should behave
as our signalling model suggests. It also eliminates the possibility that our
results are driven by women who know they are going to drop out of the labor
force and therefore, do not respond to promotion expectations.
4.4.6 Individuals in Both Samples
The results of the triple difference estimation are presented in columns
6 and 7 of table 4.6 while the marginal effects of the variables of interest are
presented in table 4.9. The results for the control variables do not differ sig-
nificantly from the main results presented in table 4.4 with the exception of
the coefficient on the education variable. This coefficient is insignificant in the
present specification but is significant in each of the other specifications. The
marginal effect is also considerably smaller in magnitude than other specifica-
tions at just .0025 percentage points. It also appears that experience level has
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a negative net effect but is again relatively small at -.8% for men with high
promotion expectations.
The advantage to running the triple difference with just the sample
of individuals who appear in both time periods is that we can eliminate the
possibility that our results are driven by women who are not serious about
their careers. That is, it is likely that the full sample contains some women
who know they are going to leave the labor force and therefore, remain on
jobs despite low promotion expectations. The results presented in table 4.6
suggest that our results are not driven by this group of women. Furthermore,
the results support our signalling story. As in previous estimations, we find
that women are more likely to stay on jobs than men all else equal. Women
with high promotion expectations are 18.66% more likely to remain on jobs
than their male counterparts all else equal while women with low promotion
expectations are 2.5% more likely to remain on jobs than their male counter-
parts all else equal.21 The large difference in the likelihood of staying on a job
across gender for individuals with high promotion expectations likely reflects a
difference in the cost of finding a similar job. We also expect women to behave
more like men after they have successfully signalled attachment to the labor
force. If we consider individuals with an experience level that is one stan-
dard deviation below the mean, women with low promotion expectations are
21The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with potential experience variables is 12.07 and its associated p-value is .0071. The χ2
statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions with the low
and potential experience variables is 15.74 and its associated p-value is .0076.
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21% more likely to remain on jobs than men with low promotion expectations
all else equal. For individuals with an experience level that is one standard
deviation above the mean level, women with low promotion expectations are
only 7.5% more likely than men to remain on a job all else equal. This result
supports our explanation. It suggests that women become more responsive
to promotion expectations after they have signalled labor force attachment.
Given that our sample consists of only individuals that are attached to the
labor force, this result is strong evidence for our signalling explanation.
4.5 Conclusions
Labor economists have explained the male-female wage differential as
a consequence of women’s historic lack of attachment to the labor force. How-
ever, with a rapid rise in the female labor force participation rate over the last
few decades, the career profiles of recent cohorts of women workers has under-
gone significant changes. Studies indicate that women are now more likely to
stay on their jobs compared to men of similar characteristics. In this paper,
we examine how job turnover relates to concerns regarding a career path. We
expect to see job turnover when promotion opportunities on the job are low.
Accordingly, we study the relationship between individuals’ expectations of
promotion on their jobs and their turnover behavior. We examine how this re-
lationship varies between men and women and with experience level. It is our
hypothesis that early on in their careers, women who are strongly committed to
a career are more likely to stay on their jobs, regardless of promotion opportu-
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nities, in a bid to signal their commitment to current and potential employers.
However, once women have acquired adequate labor market experience and
their commitment to the labor force is no longer in question, we predict that
their turnover behavior will be more responsive to career opportunities and
will be similar to that of men.
We use longitudinal data for men and women from the NLSY to test
our predictions. In order to exploit the longitudinal nature of the data, we use
a random-effects probit model to estimate the probability that an individual
will stay on a job. We estimate three models: a basic model that includes
indicator variables for female and low promotion expectations; a model that
includes an interaction between female and low promotion expectations; and a
model that includes interactions between female, low promotion expectations,
and potential experience. The results from the basic specification suggest that
as expected, individuals with low expectations of promotion are less likely
to stay on their jobs than those with high expectations of promotion. This
result is repeated in the model that allows for differences in the effect of low
promotion expectations across gender. In this model, we also find that the
tendency of women to be more likely than men to stay on a job does not
vary with promotion expectations. In the third model, we find a different
result. We find that the difference across gender in the likelihood of staying
on a job varies by potential experience. By evaluating the marginal effect of
low promotion expectations at different levels of potential experience we find
support for our hypothesis that early in their career, women are more likely
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to stay on a job despite having low promotion expectations since they need to
signal their attachment to the labor force. Later in the career, women should
not differ from men in terms of their response to promotion expectations. Our
results suggest that while women are still more likely to remain on their job
in the face of low promotion expectations later in the career, the difference is
smaller than the difference early in the career.
We repeat the third model for three sub-samples: a 1979-82 sample, a
1996-98 sample and a sample of individuals that appear in both time periods.
The 1979-82 sample has more detailed information on promotion expectations.
This additional information strengthens our model but does not qualitatively
change the results. Similarly, the results from the 1996-98 sample do not differ
significantly from those of the pooled sample. By estimating the model using
the final sub-sample, we eliminate the possibility that our results are driven by
women who are not serious about their careers and therefore, unresponsive to
promotion expectations. These results further lend credence to our signalling
story that women at low levels of experience are more likely to stay on jobs
despite low promotion expectations than men of the same characteristics.
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Table 4.1: Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1979-1983
Women
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Not True at All .1324 .339 .2484 .4322
Not True .2295 .4206 .262 .4398
True .3411 .4742 .2868 .4524
Very True .297 .4571 .2027 .4021
Observations 1586 1771
Men
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Not True at All .0874 .2826 .1639 .3703
Not True .1768 .3816 .2512 .4338
True .3654 .4817 .3288 .4699
Very True .3704 .4831 .256 .4365
Observations 1601 2074
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Table 4.2: Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1996-1998
Women
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low Expectations .4461 .4972 .4564 .4983
Observations 2746 1514
Men
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low Expectations .3864 .4870 .4058 .4912
Observations 3305 1863
Note: The survey question was “Do you believe it is possible
for you to get a promotion with this employer in the next two
years?”. If the respondent replied “No”, this was coded as low
chances of promotion.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Entire Sample
Total Women Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Remained on job from t to t+1 0.5617 0.4962 0.5692 0.4952 0.5553 0.4970
Age 28.7269 8.1292 28.6096 8.1329 28.8277 8.1252
AFQT 44.4645 28.6104 43.8316 27.0915 45.0091 29.8462
Education 12.7589 2.1648 12.9290 2.0711 12.6126 2.2320
Potential Experience 10.9685 7.9043 10.6816 7.9769 11.2154 7.8334
Low Expectations of Promotion 0.4077 0.4914 0.4453 0.4970 0.3754 0.4843
Log Hourly Wage 2.0009 0.7648 1.8858 0.7188 2.0999 0.7890
Non-White 0.4284 0.4949 0.4352 0.4958 0.4226 0.4940
In Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.7994 0.4004 0.8066 0.3950 0.7932 0.4050
Number of Children 0.8238 1.1720 0.9137 1.1803 0.7464 1.1593
Stayed Single 0.4338 0.4956 0.4410 0.4965 0.4276 0.4948
Stayed Married 0.3745 0.4840 0.3595 0.4799 0.3873 0.4872
Single-Married 0.0549 0.2278 0.0579 0.2336 0.0523 0.2227
Married-Single 0.0218 0.1460 0.0252 0.1567 0.0188 0.1360
Observations 16394 7582 8812
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Table 4.4: Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job, Double and Triple Difference
Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i
In Metropolitan Statistical Areaa -.1251∗∗∗ -.0499 -.1251∗∗∗ -.0499 -.1223∗∗∗ -.0485
(.0309) (.0309) (.0309)
Number of Children -.043∗∗∗ -.0154 -.043∗∗∗ -.0154 -.0429∗∗∗ -.0153
(.0132) (.0132) (.0132)
Education .0206∗∗∗ .0074 .0206∗∗∗ .0074 .0213∗∗∗ .0076
(.0079) (.0079) (.0079)
AFQT .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0001
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Log Hourly Wage .4119∗∗∗ .1472 .4119∗∗∗ .1472 .4104∗∗∗ .1459
(.0256) (.0256) (.0256)
Potential Experience -.0219∗∗∗ -.0000 -.0218∗∗∗ -.0000 -.0562∗∗∗ -.0031
(.0081) (.0081) (.0124)
(Potential Experience)2 .001∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗ .0022∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
Low Promotion Expectationsa -.2123∗∗∗ -.0843 -.211∗∗∗ -.0838 -.6628∗∗∗
(.0239) (.0328) (.074)
Female .1548∗∗∗ .0613 .1559∗∗∗ .0618 .1138∗
(.0261) (.0325) (.0647)
(Low Chances of Promotion)*Female . -.0026 -.0231 .1825∗
(.047) (.1021)
(Pot. Experience)*Female . . .0162
(.017)
(Pot. Experience)2*Female . . -.0007
(.0008)
(Pot. Experience)*Low . . .0988∗∗∗
(.0181)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low . . -.0034∗∗∗
(.0008)
(Pot. Experience)*Low*Female . . -.0639∗∗
(.0262)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low*Female . . .0029∗∗
(.0012)
Stayed Married .4807∗∗∗ .1833 .4808∗∗∗ .1833 .4821∗∗∗ .1872
(.0321) (.0321) (.0321)
Single-Married .312∗∗∗ .1219 .312∗∗∗ .1219 .3024∗∗∗ .1196
(.0505) (.0505) (.0506)
Married-Single .1831∗∗ .0724 .1831∗∗ .0724 .1821∗∗ .0725
(.0796) (.0796) (.0794)
Non-White -.0073 -.0029 -.0073 -.0030 .0035 .0014
(.0295) (.0295) (.0295)
Constant -.9031∗∗∗ -.9037∗∗∗ -.7655∗∗∗
(.0817) (.0823) (.0873)
Predicted Probability at X .5118 .5116 .479
Observations 16394 16394 16394
ρ .2211 .2211 .2183
Log-Likelihood -10365.49 -10365.49 -10326.6
χ2 statistic 1298.822 1298.843 1353.493
Groups 7903 7903 7903
Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
For the continuous variables, the marginal effect reported is the mean of the marginal effects in the sample. In the
case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)−Φ(Xd=0β̂) where d = 1 and d = 0 represent
the dummy variable set to 1 and 0, respectively.aIndividuals are classified as having low expectations if they thought
a promotion was not likely in survey years 1979-1982 or they thought a promotion was not possible in the next 2 years
in survey years 1996 or 1998.
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Table 4.5: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Men - Low .403 .47942 .4927
Men - High .5586 .47898 .5092
Women - Low .4699 .4916 .556
Women - High .6193 .5579 .5659
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Women -.1493 -.0662 -.0098
Men -.1555 .0004 -.0164
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Low .0669 .0122 .0633
High .0607 .0789 .0567
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)− Φ(Xd=0β̂)
where d = 1 and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables
set to 1 and 0, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job by Time Period
Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i Coefficient φ(Xβ̂) ∗ β̂i
In MSA -.1168∗∗∗ -.0465 -.1548∗∗∗ -.0608 -.0978∗∗ -.0239
(.0447) (.0505) (.0421)
Number of Children -.3232∗∗∗ -.1160 -.0240 -.0080 -.0446∗∗ -.0158
(.0658) (.0164) (.0183)
Education .0641∗∗∗ .0230 .0443∗∗∗ .0148 .0066 .0023
(.0131) (.0139) (.0106)
AFQT .0000 .0000 -.0005 -.0002 .0003 .0001
(.0009) (.001) (.0008)
Log Hourly Wage .5229∗∗∗ .1876 .4591∗∗∗ .1529 .449∗∗∗ .1590
(.0497) (.0369) (.0356)
Potential Experience -.0404 .0066 -.0169 .0153 -.0575∗∗∗ -.0044
(.079) (.0647) (.0165)
(Potential Experience)2 .0125 .0018 .0023∗∗∗
(.0095) (.0019) (.0007)
Low Promotion Chances -.6684∗∗∗ -2.547∗∗∗ -.6184∗∗∗
(.1764) (.857) (.0896)
Moderate Promotion Chances -.1352 . .
(.1733)
Female -.2184 .1246 .1067
(.1963) (.8411) (.0828)
(Low Chances)*Female .1994 3.1252∗∗ .2143
(.2508) (1.2796) (.1317)
(Moderate Chances)*Female .2220 . .
(.2579)
(Pot. Exp.)*Female .3004∗∗ .0118 .0277
(.1334) (.0981) (.0247)
(Pot. Exp.)2*Female -.0402∗∗ -.0005 -.0014
(.0188) (.0028) (.0012)
(Pot. Exp.)*Low .0847 .3222∗∗∗ .0912∗∗∗
(.1063) (.0992) (.0239)
(Pot. Exp.)2*Low -.0089 -.0098∗∗∗ -.0031∗∗∗
(.0129) (.0028) (.0011)
(Pot. Exp.)*Moderate .0011 . .
(.1025)
(Pot. Exp.)2*Moderate -.0043 . .
(.0123)
(Pot. Exp.)*Low*Female -.1715 -.4153∗∗∗ -.0759∗∗
(.1679) (.1487) (.0374)
(Pot. Exp.)2*Low*Female .0322 .013∗∗∗ .0035∗∗
(.0232) (.0043) (.0017)
(Pot. Exp.)*Moderate*Female -.2084 . .
(.1745)
(Pot. Exp.)2*Moderate*Female .0365 . .
(.0245)
Stayed Married .6652∗∗∗ .2483 .5211∗∗∗ .1811 .4527∗∗∗ .1759
(.0703) (.0456) (.0441)
Single-Married .2826∗∗∗ .1115 .3581∗∗∗ .0703 .2747∗∗∗ .1087
(.0688) (.0868) (.0686)
Married-Single .1183 .0472 .1872∗∗ .1298 .2082∗ .0827
(.2722) (.0946) (.1101)
Non-White .0411 .0164 -.0485 -.0189 .0216 .0086
(.0436) (.0452) (.0384)
Const. -1.4674∗∗∗ -1.6599∗∗∗ -.6445∗∗∗
(.1945) (.6191) (.1149)
Predicted Probability at X .4934 .5983 .4859
Observations 6966 9428 8695
ρ .2187 .4121 .1544
Log-Likelihood -4454.005 -5756.515 -5431.279
χ2 statistic 462.9645 413.2975 832.5092
Groups 4902 5845 2844
Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
For the continuous variables, the marginal effect reported is the mean of the marginal effects in the sample. In the
case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)−Φ(Xd=0β̂) where d = 1 and d = 0 represent
the dummy variable set to 1 and 0, respectively.aDual Sample refers to individuals that appear in both time periods.
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Table 4.7: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1979-1982
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Men - Low .2674 .2962 .3324
Men - Moderate .4395 .431 .4375
Men - High .494 .4934 .5165
Women - Low .2944 .3836 .4706
Women - Moderate .4694 .51 .5586
Women - High .4935 .5983 .6487
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.1991 -.2147 -.1781
Men -.2266 -.1972 -.1841
Low vs. Moderate Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.175 -.1264 -.088
Men -.1721 -.1348 -.1051
Moderate vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.0241 -.0883 -.0901
Men -.0545 -.0624 -.079
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .027 .0874 .1382
Moderate .0299 .079 .1211
High -.0005 .1049 .1322
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)− Φ(Xd=0β̂)
where d = 1 and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables
set to 1 and 0, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1996-1998
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Men - Low .551 .6193 .6147
Men - High .5452 .5983 .6651
Women - Low .5652 .613 .6948
Women - High .6149 .658 .7092
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.05 -.045 -.0944
Men .0058 .021 -.0503
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .0142 -.0062 .0801
High .0696 .0597 .0441
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)− Φ(Xd=0β̂)
where d = 1 and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables
set to 1 and 0, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
Individuals in Both Samples
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 s.d. mean +1 s.d.
Men - Low .411 .4783 .4973
Men - High .5772 .4859 .51
Women - Low .4969 .4903 .5344
Women - High .6401 .5766 .5483
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.1432 -.0863 -.0139
Men -.1662 -.0076 -.0127
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .0859 .012 .0371
High .0629 .0907 .0383
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1β̂)− Φ(Xd=0β̂)
where d = 1 and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables




In the United States, self-employment among the civilian non-agricultural
civilian labor force declined from the 1920s to the early 1970s. Since then, the
incidence of self-employment has been increasing. Although the rate of self-
employment is higher among men than among women, it seems clear that the
increased rate of self-employment since the 1970s is primarily a consequence
of women selecting into self-employment. This period happened to coincide
with an era of rapidly increasing health care costs.
There are two features of the health care system - one which is charac-
teristic of any health care industry in the world and another which is specific
to the economy of the United States - that suggest that there is a linkage
between health care costs and households’ choice of employment sector in the
United States. Because there is asymmetric information about expected med-
ical costs of those purchasing health insurance, individual choice over health
insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. This phe-
nomenon, called adverse selection, is a feature of any health care industry.
In the United States, health insurance is predominantly employment-based,
which allows employers to pool the health risk of their employees and obtain
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lower health insurance premia from health insurance companies. Moreover,
employment-based health insurance enjoys a tax subsidy that is not available
to workers outside the wage-salary sector. Thus, the health insurance premia
facing workers in wage-employment tend to be significantly lower than those
facing workers in self-employment. This price wedge is likely to distort the
employment sector choices of households.
The second and third chapters of my dissertation examine how dif-
ferences in health insurance premia between the wage-employment and self-
employment sectors impact labor supply to the two sectors. The second chap-
ter is a theoretical paper. Here I describe a simple model in which the choice
of employment sector is determined jointly by household members. In this
model, everyone demands health insurance but the health insurance premium
differs between the two sectors. Households take the compensation package of-
fered by the wage-salary sector as given, and make employment-sector choices
to maximize total household utility. I address the following question: How
does employer-provided health insurance influence a household’s choice of em-
ployment sector - wage employment versus self-employment? I show that
when there is a price wedge for health insurance between the self-employment
and wage-employment sectors, labor supply to the self-employment sector is
smaller, relative to the case where there is no price wedge. Thus, the price
wedge causes a distortion in the assignment of workers between the two sec-
tors. I also show that the extension of employer-provided health benefits to
dependents outside the firm through a family health plan enables married cou-
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ples to effectively eliminate the price wedge. I extend this model to include
the insurance-purchase decision for single workers. In this model, in addition
to choosing which sector to work in, workers also decide whether to purchase
health insurance or not. I use standard results in the ‘adverse selection’ liter-
ature to illustrate how pooling the health risk over the subset of workers who
choose to buy insurance raises the insurance premium, relative to the case
where the risk-pooling is over all the workers in the firm. Moreover, firms can
capture economies of scale by getting as many workers as possible to partici-
pate in the group health insurance that they offer. This result could explain
why firms might prefer to include health benefits as part of the compensa-
tion package to all workers, instead of making the choice of health coverage
optional.
There are two extensions to this model that I believe can give us some
interesting and testable predictions. The first is to incorporate the number
of hours worked into the worker’s decision problem and to introduce two in-
puts into the firm’s production process - the number of workers and hours per
worker. This extension will allow me to examine the effect of changes in health
insurance costs on hours worked. Another extension is to allow workers’ pref-
erence for flexibility to be correlated with their valuation of health insurance.1
If firms have differential costs to offering health insurance to workers, then one
can examine the equilibrium sorting of different types of workers to different
types of firms, and the size distribution of firms.
1For instance, a single mother with a young child is likely to be a (high θ, high γ) type.
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In the third chapter, my focus of study has been the effect of the hus-
band’s employer-provided family health insurance on the wife’s propensity to
select into self-employment. A number of papers have found an association
between a married woman’s labor supply behavior and spousal health insur-
ance. A consistent finding in the literature on women’s self-employment in
the U.S. since the mid-1970s is the predominance of married women in this
sector. While numerous papers have remarked on the relationship between
spousal health insurance and a married woman’s propensity to select into self-
employment, no clean test of this linkage was established. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA86) provides us with an opportunity to test this linkage.
The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to purchase health
insurance. At the same time, it disqualified self-employed individuals who
were already enjoying health insurance benefits through a spouse from taking
advantage of the subsidy. Since the effect of the tax subsidy was to lower the
after-tax price of health insurance for those among the self-employed who were
purchasing their own health insurance, I predict that this subsidy increased
the incidence of self-employment among single women.
My estimates suggest that health insurance coverage through the spouse
biased a married woman’s employment sector choice strongly towards self-
employment in the pre-TRA86 period. Moreover, the incidence of single
women in self-employment went up significantly in the post-TRA86 period,
after controlling for the effect of health insurance coverage through the spouse.
This finding supports my hypothesis that the decrease in the price of health
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insurance through the tax subsidy induced more single women to select into
self-employment in the post-TRA86 period relative to married women. In
summary, my findings suggest that in the pre-TRA86 period, the high cost
of health insurance created a price wedge between women who enjoyed health
insurance coverage through their spouse’s health plan and those who did not.
Women who had a preference for working in the self-employment sector and
who enjoyed spousal health benefits were able to exercise their preference and
select into self-employment. On the other hand, for women with a preference
for the self-employment sector but constrained to purchase their own health in-
surance, it was too costly to opt for this sector. For these women, the TRA86,
by narrowing this price wedge, lowered the price of selecting into their desired
sector of employment.
One limitation of this chapter is that I restrict my study to women who
have chosen to be in the labor force. Although women’s labor force participa-
tion has been rising steadily over the last few decades, a substantial fraction
of working-age women still choose to stay out of the labor force. It is possi-
ble that the availability of spousal health insurance also impacts the decision
about participating in the labor force. It would therefore be fruitful to extend
the analysis in chapter 3 to a two-stage analysis: in the first stage, women
decide whether to join the labor force or not. If they decide to participate in
the labor force, they choose between self-employment and wage-employment.
This kind of analysis will address issues regarding selection, in addition to the
effect of spousal health insurance on employment sector choices.
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In the fourth chapter (joint with Richard Prisinzano), we examine dif-
ferences in job turnover patterns between men and women. We expect to see
job turnover when promotion opportunities on the job are low. Accordingly,
we study the relationship between individuals’ expectations of promotion on
their jobs and their turnover behavior. We examine how this relationship varies
between men and women and between more and less experienced workers. It is
our hypothesis that early on in their careers, women who are strongly commit-
ted to a career are more likely to stay on in their jobs, regardless of promotion
opportunities, in a bid to signal their commitment to the labor force. How-
ever, once women have acquired adequate labor market experience and their
commitment to the labor force is no longer in question, we predict that their
turnover behavior will be more responsive to career opportunities and will be
similar to that of men. Using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), we find that men and women differ in their response to promotion
expectations. Specifically, we find that early in their career women with low
promotion expectations are more likely to stay on a job than corresponding
men. We also find that this difference diminishes with experience.
Our results suggest that women who are committed to the labor market
stay on in jobs which have little or no prospects for growth early in their career
because of the need to signal their commitment to their employer. Thus,
signalling is a costly activity and leads to inefficient outcomes; women are
under-employed on their job in the early stages of their career. An obvious
extension to this chapter is to examine whether women experience a faster
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career growth once they have successfully signalled their attachment to the
labor market. Once firms come to believe that these women are serious about
their careers, they should respond by placing these women in positions that
match with their abilities. If this is the case, we should expect to see women
getting promoted more rapidly than men of comparable characteristics at later
stages in their career path. This is a topic that merits research.
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